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I. INTRODUCTION
Our federal tax laws privilege the so-called traditional, nuclear family over all
other family arrangements. This privileging is most starkly and easily illustrated
by-though in no way confined to-the blatant discrimination against families
headed by same-sex couples that permeates our tax laws.' To ameliorate this
*0 2010 Anthony C. Infanti, Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of
Law. Thanks to Bridget Crawford, Leandra Lederman, Lisa Philipps, Ximena Marinero,
and Anne Thibadeau for comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Thanks to the
University of Pittsburgh School of Law for providing financial support for the writing of
this Article. As always, thanks to Hien for his love and support in everything that I do.
' See generally Anthony C. Infanti, Deconstructing the Duty to the Tax System:
Unfettering Zealous Advocacy on BehalfofLesbian and Gay Taxpayers, 61 TAX LAW. 407
(2008); Anthony C. Infanti, Dismembering Families, in CHALLENGING GENDER
INEQUALITY IN TAX POLICY MAKING: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Kimberley Brooks et
al. eds., forthcoming); Anthony C. Infanti, The Internal Revenue Code as Sodomy Statute,
44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 763 (2004) [hereinafter Infanti, Sodomy Statute]; Anthony C.
Infanti, Taxing Civil Rights Gains, 16 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 319 (2010) [hereinafter
Infanti, Taxing Civil Rights Gains].
Recently, a federal district court found the federal Defense of Marriage Act, I U.S.C.
§ 7 (2006), insofar as it applies to the federal tax laws, to violate the right to equal
protection of the laws of several married same-sex couples from Massachusetts. Gill v.
Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 376, 383, 387-98 (D. Mass. 2010). However,
because this was not a facial challenge to the statute, it is unclear what the precise impact
of this decision will be on the sexual-orientation-based discrimination that permeates our
federal tax laws. In any event, as of this writing, it is expected that the federal government
will appeal this decision, meaning that the impact of this decision may not be finally
determined for several years, if at all. Sandhya Somashekhar, Courts Weighing in on Same-
Sex Marriage; Two Sides Watch for Appeal in Mass. Case, Ruling in Calfornia, WASH.
POST, July 10, 2010, at A2.
Even if the decision in Gill were to be upheld on appeal and were applied to all same-
sex couples who live in states that legally recognize their relationships, this decision would
leave out in the cold the many same-sex couples who live in states that refuse legal
recognition to their relationships. A different, but equally recent federal district court
decision holds greater promise for improving the legal landscape for these couples. In that
case, another federal district court held California's Proposition 8, which prohibits same-
sex couples from marrying in that state, unconstitutional as a violation of the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.
Supp. 2d 921, 991-1004 (N.D. Cal. 2010). The decision in Perry holds the promise of
extending the right to marriage to same-sex couples across the country; however, the
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discrimination, recent contributions to the tax literature have proposed establishing
variants of a federal domestic partnership regime that would equalize the tax
treatment of (1) married different-sex couples and (2) same-sex and unmarried
different-sex couples.2 Although these proposals do chip away at the hegemony of
the traditional family, they do nothing to address the tax treatment of other
nontraditional family arrangements. In other words, these proposals accept the
privileging of the traditional family in our tax laws, and they attempt only to widen
the privileged circle to include certain other relationships patterned after the
traditional family norm.
This Article breaks sharply with the approach taken in these recent proposals.
Instead of accepting the privileging of the traditional family for tax purposes, it
rejects that privileging in favor of a more inclusive approach to determining who is
family for tax purposes. The foundation for this approach is a rejection of joint
federal income tax filing, which has been the subject of a barrage of criticism from
academic commentators in the United States. These criticisms, which are
summarized in Part II below, are well taken and, by themselves, certainly provide
reason enough to abandon the joint return. However, the joint return is also
fundamentally inconsistent with an inclusive approach to determining who is
family for tax purposes. Rather than trying to determine whom an individual
considers to be part of her family, the joint return works backward by first singling
out a certain family arrangement (i.e., the traditional family headed by a married
different-sex couple) as the only relevant type of family and then seeking to
court's decision in Peny was appealed on the same day that it was issued, meaning, again,
that it may be years before we learn the ultimate outcome of that case. Gay Marriage
Appeal Filed, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 6, 2010 (National Briefs), at A5.
2 Patricia A. Cain, Taxing Families Fairly, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 805, 851-55
(2008); Shari Motro, A New "I Do": Towards a Marriage-Neutral Income Tax, 91 IOWA L.
REV. 1509, 1543-52 (2006); see also William P. Kratzke, The Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA) Is Bad Income Tax Policy, 35 U. MEM. L. REV. 399, 405-12, 442-45 (2005)
(arguing that Congress's refusal to recognize same-sex relationships for federal income tax
purposes, including for purposes of filing a joint return, is misguided); Stephanie Hunter
McMahon, To Have and to Hold: Rethinking Marital Property and Federal Tax Filing,
11 NEV. L. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 62-63) (on file with author) (proposing
that same-sex couples in relationships recognized for purposes of state law be required to
file joint federal income tax returns); Theodore P. Seto, The Unintended Tax Advantages of
Gay Marriage, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1529, 1590-92 (2008) (making a proposal similar
to those of Cain and Motro to bring the taxation of married different-sex couples and same-
sex couples into line on the ground that same-sex couples benefit from unwarranted tax
advantages due to the refusal of the federal government to recognize same-sex marriages-
and not on the ground that same-sex couples encounter discrimination in the application of
the tax laws); Keeva Terry, Separate and Still Unequal? Taxing California Registered
Domestic Partners, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 633, 649-52 (2008) (arguing in favor of the
creation of a new filing status for same-sex couples covered by community-property laws
that would be equivalent to, but separate from, married filing jointly status).
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determine whether an individual's family fits that mold.3 A family that does not fit
the traditional family mold is not a family for tax purposes and is generally
ignored.
Conversely, individual return filing is well-positioned to take into account the
diversity of family arrangements in our society because it allows us to work
forward; that is, it begins with the individual and lacks any preconceived notions
about what that individual's family ought to look like. Starting with the individual
at the center, we are able to work outward, tracing the web of that individual's tax
family (i.e., all of the economically interdependent relationships in her life).
Building on the firmer foundation that the individual return provides, this Article
outlines a proposal for an individual tax filing system that, where appropriate,
recognizes all economically interdependent relationships for tax purposes-and
not only those patterned after the traditional family headed by a married different-
sex couple.
In contrast to the recent proposals that accept the traditional family norm and
build on it, this proposal is more in keeping with, and better takes account of, "the
growing complexity of American households." At the time of the 2000 census,
51.7% of all U.S. households were headed by married different-sex couples.5 This
represented a significant decrease from the 1990 census, when about 55.2% of all
U.S. households were headed by married different-sex couples.6 Notably, this
decrease occurred despite a 15% increase in the total number of U.S. households
(from 91.9 million to 105.5 million) between 1990 and 2000, including an increase
in the absolute number of households headed by married different-sex couples
(from 50.7 million to 54.5 million).7 The remaining 48.3% of U.S. households
counted in the 2000 censfus were comprised of single-person households (25.8% of
all U.S. households), family households headed by a woman with no husband
present (12.2% of all U.S. households), family households headed by a man with
no wife present (4.2% of all U.S. households), and multiperson households in
which the individuals were not related by marriage, birth, or adoption (6.1% of all
U.S. households).8 All of these nontraditional households increased as a percentage
of the total number of U.S. households between 1990 and 2000.9 In addition, the
number of unmarried-partner households (which would fall into the larger category
of multiperson households in which the individuals are not related by marriage,
birth, or adoption) increased from 3.5% of all U.S. households in 1990 to 5.2% of
3 See I.R.C. § 6013(a) (2006) (providing that only "a husband and wife" may file a
joint return).
4 TAVIA SIMMoNs & GRACE O'NEILL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 BRIEF:
HOUSEHOLDS AND FAMILIES: 2000, at 1 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2001pubs/c2kbrO1-8.pdf.
5Id. at 2 tbl.1.
6 Id. at 3 fig.2.
7 Id. at 1.
Id. at 2 tbl. .
9 Id. at 3 fig.2.
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all U.S. households in 2000.10 This complexity in the composition of U.S.
households has been growing for some time; indeed, for decades, the percentage of
married-partner households has been declining and the percentage of non-
traditional households has been increasing in the United States."
These diverse households-as well as the many relationships that are
overlooked by the census because they span the households that it is designed to
count-are connected by an equally diverse array of ties, including familial, social,
emotional, and economic ties. The focus of this proposal is, however, on only one
set of these ties; namely, the economic ties that bind individuals together. These
ties might take the form of the financial support that same-sex or different-sex
spouses or partners provide each other, that parents and children or stepparents and
stepchildren provide each other, that siblings or other relatives provide each other,
or that friends or neighbors provide each other. This financial support might take
the form of a transfer of cash or property (or of the use of cash or property) that is
entirely gratuitous, in exchange for less than full consideration, or motivated by
gratitude for services, support, or kindness that the other person provided with no
expectation of payment or profit whatsoever.12
I have chosen to narrow my focus in this way because the income tax is most
naturally suited to supporting and accommodating-or at the very least, to
refraining from interfering with-the economic aspects of the relationships that
individuals enter into. Conversely, the income tax is, on the whole, poorly suited to
providing support for the noneconomic aspects of personal relationships, which
can usually be better accommodated through changes or adjustments to other areas
of the law or through nonlegal means. To take a simple example, the income tax is
well suited to providing incentives for the equal sharing of financial resources
within families, but it is not well suited to fostering an atmosphere of mutual
respect within families or to deterring domestic violence. It is thus appropriate to
'
0 Id. at 7.
11 JASON FIELDS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS: AMERICA'S
FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: 2003, at 4 fig.2 (2004), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p20-553.pdf.
12 1 would like to draw attention to my deliberate use of the word "interdependence"
(and variants of it) throughout this Article. I eschew use of the term "dependent" here
because, despite being a common term used throughout the Internal Revenue Code, see,
e.g., I.R.C. §§ 21, 24, 105, 132, 152 (2006), it connotes an almost parasitic type of
relationship. Instead, I contemplate here relationships of give and take. Thus, for example,
even though a parent might be providing financial support to a child today, that relationship
usually reverses sooner or later with the child providing support to the parent as she ages.
In addition, a spousal relationship might involve one spouse contributing financial
resources to the relationship through paid labor while the other performs labor in the home.
Furthermore, one friend might help out another financially because that friend has provided
care and emotional support in the past.
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focus our attention on the economic dimension of relationships, because that
dimension is most relevant to, and most readily affected by, the income tax.'3
By abandoning the joint return and replacing it with a system of mandatory
individual filing that recognizes all economically interdependent relationships, this
proposal would "decentralize" family in two very important ways. First, by
embracing individual filing, we would achieve relationship (and not just marriage)
neutrality in our income tax. This would have the salutary effect of making the
traditional, nuclear family less central to the application of so many of the
provisions in our federal income tax laws. Second, by recognizing all economically
interdependent relationships and not just those relationships patterned after the
traditional family, we would decentralize the definition of family. Rather than
determining which relationships tend to be marked by economic interdependence
based on preconceived notions of what a family should look like, economically
interdependent relationships would be determined by reference to actual taxpayer
behavior. In other words, each taxpayer would get to choose her tax family-
which might include a spouse, children, siblings, parents, cousins, friends,
neighbors, or some combination of these or other people-instead of having a one-
size-fits-all tax family imposed on her by the federal government. 14 Put differently,
13 I have detailed elsewhere the perils of maintaining too blinkered a focus on the
economic dimension of individuals when assessing the fairness of a tax system. See
generally Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Equiy, 55 BUFF. L. REv. 1191 (2008). In this Article, I
have avoided placing undue focus on the economic dimension of individuals through my
starting point for analysis. Most discussions of the tax treatment of same-sex couples (to
take one example of a nontraditional family) start from the horizontal equity premise that
all economic units should be taxed equally (a premise that is usually implicitly qualified by
the notion that an economic unit is one that looks like a traditional family). See id. at 1212-
15. 1 eschew that starting point here in favor of beginning outside the tax system and its
academic notions of appropriate economic units. I instead start from the premise that,
though we are each individuals, we form webs of connections with other individuals, and
as discussed in the text above, the fabric of these webs of connections is only growing
increasingly diverse and complex. With this (nontax) reality as a starting point, the
question then becomes how the tax system can best accommodate or support-or, at the
very least, refrain from interfering with-the formation of this variety of relationships.
Because, in its everyday application, the tax system largely concerns itself with the
economic aspects of transactions between individuals, attempting to render the tax system
neutral with regard to the economic dimension of interpersonal relationships seems the
most appropriate means of ensuring that the tax system does not impede the formation of
personal relationships. By starting outside of the tax system and refusing to apply
traditional notions of tax fairness (which focus inordinately on the economic dimension of
individuals), we are thus able to work toward a tax system that is fairer along multiple
noneconomic lines (e.g., gender and sexual orientation).
14 In theory, it might be possible to separate the two core parts of this proposal; that is,
it is certainly possible to design an individual filing system without accommodating all
economically interdependent relationships or to have a joint filing system that attempts to
accommodate economically interdependent relationships. But, separating the proposal into
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the government would cease to be in the business of creating tax incentives for the
formation of only a certain type of family and would instead begin to respect the
autonomy and liberty of each individual to enter into whatever relationships are
important to her.
This Article will proceed in four parts. Part II discusses the abolition of the
joint federal income tax return in favor of mandatory individual filing. Given the
extant, rather abundant literature on this question, Part II merely summarizes the
main arguments that commentators have made against joint filing and in favor of
individual filing, and then explains how individual filing is better equipped to
recognize the diversity of economically interdependent relationships between
individuals in our society. Part III turns to a brief description of the Canadian
individual filing system. Canada has a well-established, nearly century-old
individual filing system. Looking to the Canadian system for guidance in
developing an individual filing system for the United States is particularly
appropriate given both (1) Canada's long experience with individual filing and (2)
a recent Law Commission of Canada report advocating changes to the Canadian
tax system in order to recognize the diversity of relationships that Canadians enter
into. Part IV outlines a proposed individual filing system for the United States that
moves "beyond conjugality" (to borrow a phrase from the Law Commission of
Canada) and seeks to recognize the many-and varied-economically
interdependent relationships that we establish throughout our lives. Part IV also
further elaborates on the reasons for focusing this proposal on the economic
dimension of interpersonal relationships. Part V provides brief concluding
remarks.
two components produces a less than desirable result. On the one hand, an individual filing
system that failed to accommodate economically interdependent relationships would be
based on the unrealistic assumption that we are all atomistic individuals without any
relevant connections to each other and would, in all likelihood, serve only to impede the
development of the economic dimension of personal relationships. More probable,
however, is that such a system would be designed to accommodate only certain
economically interdependent relationships; indeed, as described in Part II, infra, to the
extent that commentators have developed proposals for individual filing systems, those
proposals have revolved around the effect of individual filing on (and only on) the
traditional family. On the other hand, even if a joint filing system did attempt to
accommodate economically interdependent relationships, the existence of joint filing
would still privilege certain relationships over others (at the very least, those composed of
two individuals and, again more probably, those composed of two individuals in a conjugal
relationship). It is only through the synergy achieved by uniting the two parts-individual
filing and accommodating economically interdependent relationships-that the proposal
can achieve the desired result of decentralizing family for tax purposes.
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II. MANDATORY INDIVIDUAL TAx RETURN FILING
A. Backgiound
Though it is often described as adopting the individual as the basic taxable
unit,'5 the U.S. federal income tax has been more colorfully described as a
"patchwork . . . of compromises" that evidence a "tension between rugged
individualism and family solidarity."16 This patchwork developed over an extended
period. In its early years, the U.S. federal income tax "was dominated by an
individualistic approach."' 7 Since then, Congress has departed in important ways
from the individual baseline and moved toward viewing the traditional, nuclear
family as the taxable unit. For example, in 1948, Congress introduced the income-
splitting joint return for married (different-sex) couples.'8 Three years later, in
1951, Congress created a separate rate schedule for heads of household in response
to complaints that they had family responsibilities similar to those of married
(different-sex) couples.' 9 This rate schedule provided heads of household with "a
tax liability for a given amount that was midway between the liability for a single
person and that of a married couple filing a joint return.'' 20 Responding another
three years later to complaints from those recently widowed and suddenly deprived
of the benefit of the income-splitting joint return, Congress extended the benefit of
income splitting to certain surviving spouses in 1954.21 As a result of these
incremental changes, there are now five separate categories for filing status on the
Form 1040 (i.e., single, married filing jointly, married filing separately, head of
15 1 BORIS 1. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES, AND GIFTS 2.3 (3d ed. 1999) ("From its inception, . . . the federal income tax
has been based on the ... view that every individual should be permitted to file a personal
income tax return embracing his or her own income but not the income of the taxpayer's
spouse, children, or other relatives.").
16 Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1389,
1391 (1975).
. Id. at 1400; see also Carolyn C. Jones, Split Income and Separate Spheres: Tax
Law *and Gender Roles in the 1940s, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 259, 259 (1988) ("Before the
income-splitting joint tax return for husbands and wives became a part of the Internal
Revenue Code in 1948, the federal income tax was assessed essentially on an individual
basis.").
18 Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, § 303, 62 Stat. 110, 115.
1 Revenue Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-183, § 301, 65 Stat. 452, 480; Bittker, supra
note 16, at 1417.
20 Bittker, supra note 16, at 1417.
21 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 2, 68A Stat. 3, 8; Bittker,
supra note 16, at 1417-18.
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household, and qualifying widow(er)), all of which speak to the individual's
relationship to "traditional" marriage.22
Yet, "the joint filing provisions are just one example of a scheme of taxation
where considerations of marital status are pervasive." 2 3 For instance, in 1984,
Congress fully embraced the idea of the married different-sex couple as a single
economic unit for tax purposes when it took the last step toward making transfers
of property between a husband and wife completely income, gift, and estate tax
free. 24 And, in 1986, Congress enacted the "kiddie tax" that makes the family a
quasi-taxable unit (at least with respect to the unearned income of minor
children).25 These are just a few of the "[m]any features of the Federal Income Tax
Code [that] reflect the assumption that our society is composed of heterosexual
married couples, with men occupying the 'public' sphere and women occupying
the 'private' domestic sphere."26
This privileging of the traditional, nuclear family in tax policy debates has not
been without controversy. In particular, academic commentators have sharply
criticized the joint federal income tax return and many have called for its repeal.
The joint federal income tax return as we now know it did not make its way onto
the U.S. tax scene until some thirty-five years after the ratification of the Sixteenth
22 I.R.S. FORM 1040: U.S. INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURN 1 (2009). Naturally,
"married" (whether filing jointly or separately) refers to an individual who is currently a
party to a state-sanctioned different-sex marriage, see 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (recognizing
only different-sex marriages for purposes of federal law); "widow(er)" refers to someone
whose different-sex spouse has passed away; "single" refers not to the individual as such,
but to an individual who is not currently married or widowed; and, as mentioned in the text
above, "head of household" refers to someone who has obligations similar to those of a
married (different-sex) couple. See I.R.S. INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1040, at 14-16 (2009).
23 Nancy J. Knauer, Heteronormativity and Federal Tax Policy, 101 W. VA. L. REV.
129, 132 (1998).
24 H.R. REP. No. 98-432, at 1491 (1984); Patricia A. Cain, Death Taxes: A Critique
from the Margin, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 677, 680 (2000).
25 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1411, 100 Stat. 2085, 2714.
26 Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571, 1571 (1996).
In the United States, to take an important example, tax systems, mainly
created in the twentieth century-and hence generally free of the openly sexist
language found in England and many Commonwealth societies-are not facially
gendered. Yet major features of the American tax system were put in place in
the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, periods when the one-earner family with a stay-at-
home wife was both the descriptive fact and the normative ideal for most
Americans. These structural elements persist, unmitigated and indeed often
increased in their magnitudes, well into the 21st Century.
Edward McCaffery, Where's the Sex in Fiscal Sociology?: Taxution and Gender in
Comparative Perspective, in THE NEW FISCAL SOCIOLOGY: TAXATION IN COMPARATIVE
AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 216, 217 (Isaac William Martin et al. eds., 2009).
612 [No. 3
DECENTRALIZING FAMILY
Amendment. After several failed attempts, 27 Congress enacted the income-splitting
joint return in 1948.28 As mentioned above, prior to that time, the income tax "was
dominated by an individualistic approach."29 Congress did not, however, make the
decision to shift the focus so radically away from the individual on the basis of
sound tax policy considerations, but instead did so as a politically expedient means
of ending the movement among the states toward the adoption of community-
property regimes that would allow their residents to save taxes by splitting their
income. 30 In moving toward community-property regimes, the states were acting in
response to two earlier U.S. Supreme Court decisions. One of these decisions
27 Bittker, supra note 16, at 1408-11.
28 Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, §§ 301, 303, 62 Stat. 110, 114, 115.
29 Bittker, supra note 16, at 1400; see also Jones, supra note 17, at 259 ("Before the
income-splitting joint tax return for husbands and wives became a part of the Internal
Revenue Code in 1948, the federal income tax was assessed essentially on an individual
basis.").
30 S. REP. No. 80-1013, at 26 (1948) ("Adoption of these income-splitting provisions
will produce substantial geographical equalization in the impact of the tax on individual
incomes. The impetuous enactment of conimunity-property legislation by States that have
long used the common law will be forestalled."); Bittker, supra note 16, at 1412-13
(suggesting that adoption of the income-splitting joint return had the same result as if
Congress had stood "idly by while the whole country adopted the community property
system, but enactment of the income-splitting joint return meant that the political credit for
reducing taxes was concentrated on Congress rather than dispersed among the state
legislatures"); Jones, supra note 17, at 295 (referring to Bittker's assertion quoted in the
immediately preceding citation: "The real point of this state-versus-federal conflict was in
the quality of relief provided. State legislatures could offer tax reduction only by altering
married people's legal rights to income and property; Congress could and did offer tax
reduction without any change in the legal rights between spouses."); id. at 296 ("The ...
income-splitting joint return was . . . more expensive than either the Gearhart bill [that
would have recognized husband-wife income-splitting agreements] or allowing the states
to adopt community-property legislation. While it possessed the virtue of ease of
administration, it also was viewed as a way of conserving traditional gender roles and
power relationships."); Lily Kahng, Innocent Spouses: A Critique of the New Tax Laws
Governing Joint and Several Liability, 49 VILL. L. REV. 261, 272 (2004) ("The political
motivation for the 1948 tax law change was to procure for husbands in common law states
the lower tax burden enjoyed by their counterparts in community property states, thus
rendering meaningless for tax purposes the stronger property rights of women in
community property states and quelling the movement towards adoption of community
property laws. The camouflage for the political motivation was the unfounded assertion
that a married couple is a single unit and that equal-income marital units should bear the
same tax burden no matter what their state of residence." (footnote omitted)); Lawrence
Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339, 347 (1994) ("Rather than
being based on bedrock beliefs about the nature of marital sharing, the 1948 legislation was
essentially a historical accident-a response to the geographic discrimination and legal
confusion resulting from the combination of Lucas v. Earl and Poe v. Seaborn.").
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allowed full income splitting by married couples in community-property states,3 1
and the other disallowed the splitting of earned income by married couples in
common-law states.32 Many of the current tax policy justifications for the income-
splitting joint return are thus little more than "after-the-fact rationalization[s]" for
an essentially political compromise.33
B. Critiques ofJoint Filing
In recent decades, U.S. commentators of all stripes have called for the
abolition of the joint federal income tax return. These commentators have offered a
multiplicity of reasons to support this suggested reform of the U.S. federal income
tax filing system. The remainder of this section briefly summarizes some of the
most salient and trenchant arguments against joint filing and in favor of individual
filing.
The principal after-the-fact justification for permitting a "husband and wife"34
to file a joint return that splits their income for federal income tax purposes is that
it reflects the fact that married couples act as a single economic unit by pooling
their financial resources. Commentators have countered this justification by
pointing out that the joint return is actually poorly targeted at those who act
together as a single economic unit. In particular, Marjorie Kornhauser has used
empirical data to demonstrate that the class of taxpayers permitted to file a joint
31 Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 118 (1930).
32 Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 113-15 (1930); see also Poe, 282 U.S. at 117.
3 Zelenak, supra note 30, at 343.
In more recent scholarship, defenders of the joint return have argued that
the income-splitting device provided by the joint return is more equitable than
proposed alternatives because it treats a married couple as two individuals who
equally benefit from their combined incomes. This defense, however, was
articulated in a more sophisticated form post hoc, after the adoption of the joint
return.
Jones, supra note 17, at 261 (footnotes omitted); see also Kahng, supra note 30, at 272
(describing the political motivation for enacting the joint return and referring to the
"fiction" of marital unity). But see S. REP. No. 80-1013, at 26 (1948) (citing the lessening
of administrative burdens stemming from self-help income splitting by married couples in
common-law states as a benefit of adopting the income-splitting joint return).
34 I.R.C. § 6013(a) (2006). In effect, "[j]oint returns subject all married couples with
the same amount of taxable income to the same tax liability, regardless of how their income
and deductions are divided between them." 4A BORIS 1. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN,
FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES, AND GIFTS 111.3.2.1 (3d ed. 2000).
3 See, e.g., Zelenak, supra note 30, at 344 ("The standard justification for joint
returns is that the typical married couple pools its income.").
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federal income tax return is both over- and underinclusive.36 In reviewing the
empirical data, Kornhauser has painted a complex picture in which some married
couples pool their finances, others do not, and many send signals that contradict
the outward appearance of their financial arrangement (e.g., by treating jointly held
assets as separate property or separately held assets as joint property).37 As a result,
the class of potential joint return filers is overinclusive because it includes many
married different-sex couples who do not pool their financial resources or act as a
single economic unit. 3 Yet, at the same time, the class of potential joint return
filers is underinclusive because it excludes many nontraditional families who
actually do pool financial resources and act as a single economic unit.3 9
In the same vein, it has been argued that individual return filing is more
consistent with our tax system's basic principle that the person who
controls the income should be taxed on it even if another benefits. The
control principle is particularly apt for earned income since only the
earner can produce that income. As the empirical studies show, the
36 See generally Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-
Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGs L.J. 63 (1997). Others have made
similar points:
Although couples undoubtedly share income and operate as an economic
unit to some extent, all couples at all income levels do not universally adopt this
pattern for their entire income. Moreover, if this theory is a correct basis for
assessing tax burdens, it incorrectly includes only sharing in households of
married persons and ignores sharing by single adults who similarly divide their
income with others.
Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in Allocating Income Tax
Burdens, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1, 31 (1980); see also Jeannette Anderson Winn & Marshall
Winn, Till Death Do We Split: Married Couples and Single Persons Under the Individual
Income Tax, 34 S.C. L. REV. 829, 851 (1983) ("Although income splitting is best explained
under the benefit theory, and by implication, the concept of income pooling, it is a tenuous
justification."); Laura Ann Davis, Note, A Feminist Justification for the Adoption of an
Individual Filing System, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 197, 216-17 (1988) ("The use of marital
status as a proxy for pooling is problematic in that marital status both overstates and
understates the true incidence of pooling. The simple fact is that not all individuals who
pool income are married and not all married individuals pool.").
For a different interpretation of the data that Kornhauser examined, see Zelenak,
supra note 30, at 348-54.
3 Kornhauser, supra note 36, at 80-91.
38 Id. at 105-06.
39 Id. at 106-07.
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earner usually controls the income even if the couple states that they
pool.40
This argument is buttressed by others who have critiqued the joint and several
liability that accompanies the filing of a joint federal income tax return. Lily
Kahng has explained how joint and several liability can "produce unjust or
irrational results."4 1 And Amy Christian has asserted that, when joint and several
liability is considered together with the income-splitting and income-aggregation
aspects of the joint return, "the joint return produces a powerful structural bias
against wives."42
Another significant critique of the joint return is aimed not at after-the-fact
justifications for its enactment but at the (dis)incentive effects that it creates in
operation. A number of commentators have argued that joint filing contributes to
the creation of a distinct tax disincentive for secondary earners-who are
predominantly women-from entering the paid workforce.43 This disincentive
results because the aggregation of the couple's income causes the secondary
earner's wages effectively to be taxed beginning at the primary earner's marginal
tax rate, depriving her of the benefit of the zero bracket amount and the lower
initial brackets in the tax rate schedule (which have already been applied to, and
exhausted by, the primary earner's income). Amy Christian has provocatively
asserted that, by operating in this way, the joint return actually "redistributes
resources from the lower-earning to the higher-earning spouse, that is, typically
from the wife to her husband." 44 Naturally, the obverse of this disincentive is a
distinct tax incentive for secondary earners (again, predominantly women) to
devote themselves to unpaid productive activity in the home:
[I]ncome splitting is most beneficial to couples in which one spouse
earns significantly more than the other. The closer the incomes of the
40 Id. at 109; see also Zelenak, supra note 30, at 354-58 (asserting that joint filing is
more consistent with a focus on consumption of income and that individual filing is more
consistent with a focus on the control of income).
41 Kahng, supra note 30, at 290.
42 Amy C. Christian, Joint and Several Liability and the Joint Return: Its Implications
for Women, 66 U. Cni. L. REv. 535, 537 (1998); see id. at 604-15 (explaining this point).
43 Grace Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income Taxation of
Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFF. L. REv. 49, 88-95 (1971); Amy C. Christian, The
Joint Return Rate Structure: Identifying and Addressing the Gendered Nature of the Tax
Law, 13 J.L. & POL. 241, 287-303 (1997); Gann, supra note 36, at 39-46; Kornhauser,
supra note 36, at 109-10; Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at
Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REv. 983, 989-96, 1014-29 (1993);
Winn & Winn, supra note 36, at 869-70; Zelenak, supra note 30, at 365-66; Davis, supra
note 36, at 210-14.




two spouses, the less benefit income splitting confers. Therefore, income
splitting provides a tax benefit primarily to couples who fit traditional
roles in which the husband earns most or all of the income and in which
the wife does not work. . . . The benefit of income splitting is minimal
for couples in which the spouses earn similar amounts, that is, for
couples whose working patterns defy traditional, stereotypical roles in
which the husband is gainfully employed and the wife is not. In fact, the
benefit is nonexistent if the spouses earn equal incomes. By benefiting
disparate-income couples, the income-splitting feature of the joint return
rewards working patterns that conform to sexist stereotypes while failing
to reward taxpayers who challenge the stereotype. One may question the
propriety of a tax system containing a benefit whose availability and
amount is tied to how closely the couple fits a sexist stereotype.45
Dorothy Brown has, however, drawn attention to the essentialism of these
arguments by pointing out that women's occupation of the secondary earner slot
varies significantly based on race and class; in other words, when the data is
broken down by race and class-rather than simply being aggregated for all
women-there are categories in which the woman is a different-sex couple's
primary or equal earner.46
The joint return has been assailed-and the individual return has been,
advocated-on a number of other grounds. For example, commentators have
argued that we should abandon the joint return and adopt mandatory separate filing
to achieve a marriage-neutral income tax.47 Lily Kahng has taken this argument a
step further by highlighting the negative impact of the joint return on single people,
and she has advocated repeal of the joint return as a means of facilitating single
people's ability to move forward in forging a positive social identity.4 8
Toni Robinson and Mary Moers Wenig have argued against the joint return
on administrability grounds. They have assailed the use of marital status as a
determinant of tax liability on the ground that it has given rise to a multiplicity of
rules regarding who is (or is not) married for tax purposes, adding unnecessary
levels of complexity to our income tax system:
A review of the details of the marital status definitions confirms that
marital status is an unsatisfactory criterion. Its use requires arbitrary
definitional choices. Yet it fails as a measure of ability to pay and
45 Id. at 279-80 (footnotes omitted).
46 Dorothy A. Brown, Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism in Tax Literature: The
Joint Return, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1469, 1488-1507 (1997).
4' Gann, supra note 36, at 32-39; James E. Maule, Tax and Marriage: Unhitching the
Horse and the Carriage, 67 TAX NOTES 539, 548-49 (1995).
48 Lily Kahng, One Is the Loneliest Number: The Single Taxpayer in a Joint Return
World, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 651, 683-84 (2010).
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produces aberrational results. If a taxpayer can obtain advice as to his
marital status for tax filing purposes only from "someone highly
informed with respect to tax law" the definition is an unacceptable
determinant. If he still needs expert help when he pursues his petition to
the Tax Court (when the advice comes too late), the tax law of marital
status demands simplification.49
Returning to the impact of the joint return on women, commentators have
argued that mandatory separate filing would create a salutary incentive for
husbands to transfer property to their wives to achieve a measure of income
splitting, which under the current joint filing system can be achieved without the
actual sharing of property.so In addition, it has been argued that an individual
return system would allow for better targeting of tax incentives aimed at children,
because, "[a]rguably, there is a better chance that the money would be spent for the
children if the woman gets the credit. Studies show that women are more likely
than men to allocate more of their earnings to children."5 '
C. International Trend Toward Individual Filing
When viewed from a wider, international perspective, advocates of individual
filing can also find support for their proffered reform in the practice of other
countries. As the Congressional Budget Office has explained:
The United States is among a minority of developed nations that tax
married couples. More than two-thirds of the countries that are members
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) tax married couples as individuals. Only three other developed
countries tax couples jointly as does the United States, and four others
tax all family members as a single entity .... Furthermore, the trend has
been moving away from joint taxation ....
49 Toni Robinson & Mary Moers Wenig, Marry in Haste, Repent at Tax Time:
Marital Status as a Tax Determinant, 8 VA. TAx REv. 773, 791-92 (1989) (footnotes
omitted) (quoting Forrest v. Conm'r, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1033, 1038 (1978)).5 0 E.g., Gann, supra note 36, at 46-51.
5' Kornhauser, supra note 36, at 110.
52 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONG., FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: MARRIAGE AND
THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 8 (1997); see also id. app. A; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION
& DEV., OECD TAX POLICY STUDIES No. 13, FUNDAMENTAL REFORM OF PERSONAL
INCOME TAX 54 (2006) ("Many OECD countries have moved away from family-based
taxation towards individually based systems . . . . Seventeen of the OECD countries used
pure individual taxation and four countries . . . used pure joint taxation of earnings in
2005."); McCaffery, supra note 26, at 6-8 (describing the international trend toward
individual filing, but noting that the Czech Republic bucked that trend when it adopted
joint filing in 2005).
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D. Recognizing the Diversity ofRelationships
Given the incisive critiques of joint filing described above and the clear
international trend toward individual filing, it would seem that rectifying
'discrimination against nontraditional families by slightly widening the circle of
privileged relationships that are permitted to file joint returns is more of a step
backward than a step forward. As Nancy Knauer has keenly observed with regard
to proposals to extend joint filing to same-sex couples:
To the extent same-sex couples want the tax code to recognize their
relationships, they are at odds with the emerging consensus that the
individual and not the married couple should be the appropriate unit of
taxation. Thus, lesbian and gay scholars seem to be asking for inclusion
in the very regime that other progressive scholars are trying to dismantle
in the name of greater female autonomy.
A more inclusive approach would not simply seek out additional family forms in
the mold of the traditional family, but would attempt to recognize and
accommodate the multiplicity and complexity of family relationships and the webs
of connections between individuals that actually exist in society.
Individual filing lends itself much more easily to this endeavor than does joint
filing. Joint filing begins with a certain type of relationship in mind, namely, that
of the conjugal couple. This preestablished framework inevitably skews the search
toward other similar relationships that then seem appropriate candidates for
inclusion in an expanded joint filing regime. In contrast, individual filing begins
with no preconceived notions about the relationships that an individual might enter
into. An individual filing system is thus more malleable because it can be shaped
to fit the actual social relationships that the individual enters into-as opposed to
joint filing, which attempts to fit complex social relationships into preconceived
molds codified in the tax laws.
In keeping with the family theme of this Article, it may help to think of these
two filing systems as being akin to two different shape-sorters-those educational
children's toys that typically consist of a wooden board with cutouts in a variety of
shapes and an equal number of wooden blocks of corresponding shape that the
child attempts to place in the appropriate cutout. 5 4 Joint filing is like a shape-sorter
with only a single cutout (e.g., a circle) but a variety of wooden blocks (e.g., a
circle, a square, a rectangle, a triangle, an oval, etc.). A child playing with this
board would simply learn to sort the circle out of all of the other blocks. The circle
5 Knauer, supra note 23, at 157.
54 On the benefits of shape sorter toys, see Alison Bell, The Benefits of Shape-Sorter
Toys, PARENTING, http://www.parenting.com/article/Baby/Gear/The-Benefits-of-Shape-
Sorter-Toys (last visited July 18, 2010).
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would fit within the cutout and all of the other blocks would simply be put to the
side in a pile of non-circles. Instead of learning about the diversity of shapes that
exist in the world, the child would learn that only one shape matters: circles.
Individual filing is more like the typical shape-sorter; that is, a board with a wide
variety of cutouts corresponding to the same wide variety of wooden blocks. This
version of the toy privileges no single shape; rather, each shape has its place and
can be accommodated on the board.
The skewing effect of adopting joint filing is evidenced in the course of the
tax policy debate since the adoption of the income-splitting joint return. Ever since
that time, the tax policy debate regarding the appropriate taxable unit has revolved
around the traditional, nuclear family and its core-the different-sex couple united
in marriage. As mentioned above, the debates in the 1950s about the appropriate
taxation of heads of household and then widows and widowers
responded to the complaint of unmarried taxpayers with dependents that their
family responsibilities were comparable to those of married couples. But the
provisions [for heads of household and widow(er)s] did not question-indeed,
they implicitly ratified-the tax differential established in 1948 between a
married couple and a single person with the same income.
Since the 1969 change in the rate schedule to reduce the singles penalty, the tax
policy debate has been focused on the competing ideals of "marriage" neutrality
and "couples" neutrality (read: different-sex married couples neutrality) and on the
associated questions of whether penalties should be imposed on those who are
married or those who are unmarried and of whether the tax laws should encourage
or discourage marriage.56 A natural concomitant of this unbending focus on the
traditional family is that all other types of relationships are ignored in this debate.
If we wish to recognize and accommodate the multiplicity and complexity of
family relationships and the webs of connections between individuals that actually
exist in society, it would seem that the first natural step would be to abandon our
extant joint filing regime. Indeed, Kathy, Lahey has observed that this is precisely
what has occurred when societies move away from a rigid adherence to the
traditional family form:
[J]oint models of the tax unit tend to be replaced with individual models
as relationships recognized in law become more diverse, as sex roles
become more egalitarian, as social values become less "traditional" and
inclusive, as women gain direct legal interests in incomes and assets, and
as the state assumes more responsibility for the welfare of children. 7
5 Bittker, supra note 16, at 1418.
56 See id. at 1430.
57 KATHLEEN A. LAHEY, THE BENEFIT/PENALTY UNIT IN INCOME TAX POLICY:
DIVERSITY AND REFORM 25 (2000), available at http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.calcollection
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Accordingly, this Article adopts individual filing as the starting point for
fashioning a tax system that decentralizes family.
The adoption of an individual tax filing system in the United States is not as
politically unrealistic as other commentators believe.5s In fact, Sweden taxed the
family as a unit for centuries following the initial inception of its income tax in
1710; however, it gradually moved to an individual tax filing system in response to
demographic changes during the twentieth century. In 1960, Sweden moved to an
ascriptive definition of marital status that included unmarried cohabitants that was
designed to put an end to the practice of high-income couples either cohabiting
outside of marriage or obtaining a "tax divorce" (i.e., a couple would divorce, live
apart long enough to convince the tax authorities that the divorce was bona fide,
and then secretly move back in together).59 Women's organizations in Sweden
began to criticize joint filing in the early 1960s on the ground that it created a
disincentive for women to enter the labor force because, as described above, they
would begin to be taxed at their husband's marginal tax rate.60 Because these
complaints coincided with a labor shortage in the country, the government swiftly
enacted reforms, first providing an individual filing option for earnings in 1965
and then abolishing the joint taxation of earnings in 1970.6 Sweden later moved to
the separate taxation of unearned income as well. 62 Given the continuing demo-
graphic changes in the United States described in the introduction to this Article,
individual tax filing should only become increasingly politically palatable as time
passes.
An individual filing system is, however, only a starting point for fashioning a
tax system that decentralizes family. The next step in the analysis is to consider the
ways in which an individual filing system should take into account the
economically interdependent connections and relationships that many of us have.
Unfortunately, most U.S. commentators end their analyses with a-call to abolish
the joint federal income tax return and devote little attention to the appropriate
2008/lcc-cdc/JL2-46-2000E.pdf.
58 Motro, supra note 2, at 1513; see Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something About
Marriage Penalties: A Guide for the Perplexed, 54 TAX L. REV. 1, 2-3 & n. 11 (2000)
(indicating his belief that mandatory individual feeling is not a political possibility in the
near future, but that it is a possibility in the long run).
5 Louise Dulude, Taxation of the Spouses: A Comparison of Canadian, American,
British, French and Swedish Law, 23 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 67, 80 (1985); see LAHEY, supra
note 57, at 27 (indicating that Sweden gradually moved to individual filing from joint filing
during the 1950s and 1960s).
60 Dulude, supra note 59, at 80.
61 Id. at 81.
62 HUGH J. AULT ET AL., COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL
ANALYSIs 262-63 (2d ed. 2004).
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design for an individual filing system. In the few cases where commentators have
explored the implementation of an individual filing system, they have focused their
attention almost exclusively on whether-and, if so, how-that system should
continue to accommodate financial transactions between married different-sex
spouses.64 This Article departs from these contributions to the literature by
widening the focus to consider how to design an individual filing system that
accommodates transactions between all economically interdependent individuals-
and not only those in marriage or marriage-like relationships.
Before developing a proposal for accommodating transactions between
economically interdependent individuals in the context of an individual filing
system, the next section of this Article sketches the contours of individual taxation
in Canada. It has been said that Canada "has the most extensive system of
individual taxation."6 5 In Canada, "[t]he individual has always been the taxable
unit, though there has been periodic discussion to establish spouses or the family
as the taxable unit." 66 Looking to Canada's long experience with an individual
filing system will be helpful in fashioning a proposal for adoption in the United
States. A recent report issued by the Law Commission of Canada makes that
country an even more appropriate choice in looking elsewhere for guidance on
developing an individual filing system. In that report, the Law Commission
advocated reconsidering the relevance of relationships to Canadian law-including
Canadian tax law-to determine whether the law might not be revised to recognize
the broad diversity of relationships entered into by Canadians rather than merely
recognizing conjugal relationships.67
63 See Brown, supra note 46, at 1485-86 ("The most popular solution the literature
proposes is the abolition of the joint return .... Although acknowledging the difficulty in
implementing ... a[n individual return] system, most commentators have not attempted to
work through the difficult theoretical issues."); Zelenak, supra note 30, at 381 ("If spouses
are required to file separate returns there must be rules for determining how income
(especially property income), deductions, and credits are allocated between the spouses.
For the most part, advocates of separate returns have given scant consideration to these
design issues.").
* E.g., Gann, supra note 36, at 52-67; Winn & Winn, supra note 36, at 870-80;
Zelenak, supra note 30, at 381-401; Davis, supra note 36, at 235-48; see also STAFF OF
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, THE INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF MARRIED COUPLES AND
SINGLE PERSONS 38-46 (1980) (discussing technical issues relating to the implementation
of separate filing for married couples).
65 AULT ET AL., supra note 62, at 267.
66 Id. at 261; see also LAW COMM'N OF CAN., BEYOND CONJUGALITY: RECOGNIZING
AND SUPPORTING CLOSE PERSONAL ADULT RELATIONSHIPS 67 (2001) [hereinafter BEYOND
CONJUGALITY], available at http://www.samesexmarriage.ca/docs/beyond-conjugality.pdf.67 See BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 66, passim.
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III. INDIVIDUAL TAXATION IN CANADA
A. Background
The Canadian Income Tax Act (ITA)68 requires each individual to file a
separate return reporting his or her income tax liability under a single progressive
rate schedule. 69 Canada has had an individual filing system since the introduction
of its income tax in 1917.70 In the context of a comparative survey of individual
versus joint filing in five different countries, Louise Dulude attributed Canada's
early adoption of individual filing (as well as the United States' initial embrace of
individual filing) to the influence of the underlying property law treatment of
ownership by women.7' Thus, in Canada (and the United States), women "had
gained control of their property when the first permanent income tax provisions
were introduced. . . , [and] it was taken for granted that the taxpayer would be the
individual."72 In contrast, in France, Great Britain, and Sweden, the husband had
control of the family's property at the time that an income tax was introduced in
those countries, and the tax laws initially followed suit by treating the couple or
family as the taxable unit.73
Despite Canada's longstanding adherence to an individual system of taxation,
there has been a recurring debate about whether the family is a more appropriate
taxable unit.74 In fact, in 1966, the Royal Commission on Taxation (commonly
called the Carter Commission, after its chair, Kenneth Carter) recommended that
"Canada abandon separate taxation in favour of a taxpaying unit which would
include the spouses and their. dependent children."75 The Canadian federal
government rejected this proposal in 1969, in significant part due to the actual or
perceived opposition of women to the change. 76 Then, in the mid-1970s, the
federal Interdepartmental Committee on the Taxation of Women evenly split on
the question of the taxable unit, with half of its members favoring joint filing and
half favoring retention of individual filing of returns.7  Since that time,
68 Income Tax Act, R.S.C., c. 1 (5th Supp. 1985) (Can.) [hereinafter ITA].
69 Id. §§ 117(2), 150(1).
70 Dulude, supra note 59, at 81-82.
71 Id. at 87.
72 Id.
7 Id. Great Britain and Sweden have since moved to individual filing systems. AULT
ET AL., supra note 62, at 262-63.
74 Joyce M. Crago, The Unit of Taxation: Current Canadian Issues, 52 U. TORONTO
FAC. L. REv. 1, 2 (1993).
7 Dulude, supra note 59, at 84.
76 Id.
n Id. at 84-85.
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commentators have regularly debated whether the individual or the family is the
appropriate taxable unit for purposes of the Canadian federal income tax.x
Even under Canada's system of individual filing, family responsibilities do
creep into (and have increasingly crept into) the tax calculation. 7 9 Thus,
notwithstanding the inability to file a joint return, there is a section of the Canadian
income tax return where the taxpayer must indicate his or her marital status (i.e.,
married, in a common-law partnership, widowed, divorced, separated, or single).so
Notably, Canada recognizes not only same-sex and different-sex couples who have
married, but it also recognizes unmarried same-sex and different-sex common-law
partners. For tax purposes, "common-law partner" is defined as "a person who
cohabits . . . in a conjugal relationship with the taxpayer" and either (1) "has so
cohabited with the taxpayer for a continuous period of at least one year" or (2) is
the parent of a child who is also the taxpayer's child.8 '
To get a sense of the extent to which marital and/or familial status may affect
the application of the Canadian federal income tax laws despite the nominally
78 E.g., LAHEY, supra note 57, passim; Jasvinder S. Basran, Individual or Family:
Beyond Ability to Pay, an Examination of the Appropriate Unit of Tax in Relation to the
Broad Goals and Policies of the Canadian Tax System, 57 SASK. L. REv. 349 passim
(1993); Neil Brooks, The Irrelevance of Conjugal Relationships in Assessing Tax Liability,
in TAX UNITS AND THE TAX RATE SCALE 35 (John G. Head & Richard Krever eds., 1996);
Crago, supra note 74, passim; Kathleen Lahey, Heteronormativity, Equality, and the
Family: Beyond the Freedom to Many, 4 J.L. & EQUALITY 117, 137-44 (2005); Kathleen
A. Lahey, The Tax Unit in Income Tax Theory, in WOMEN, THE LAW, AND THE ECONOMY
277 passim (Diane E. Pask et al. eds., 1985) [hereinafter Lahey, Tax Unit]; Jack London,
The Family as the Basic Tax Unit, 1 CAN. TAX'N 4 passim (1979); Jack R. London, The
Impact of Changing Perceptions of Social Equity on Tax Policy: The Marital Tax Unit, 26
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 287 passim (1988) [hereinafter London, Marital Tax Unit]; Maureen
Maloney, Women and the Income Tax Act: Marriage, Motherhood, and Divorce, 3 CAN. J.
WOMEN & L. 182 passim (1989); Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Taxes, Transfers, and the Family, 34
U. TORONTO L.J. 314 passim (1984); see BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 66, at 66
(acknowledging the debate); id. at 67-71 (making the case for retaining the individual as
the taxable unit in Canada); see also Judith E. Grbich, The Tax Unit Debate Revisited:
Notes on the Critical Resources ofa Feminist Revenue Law Scholarship, 4 CAN. J. WOMEN
& L. 512 passim (1990) (providing a critique of the neoclassical economic underpinnings
of this debate and urging the use of alternative methodologies).
7 See LAHEY, supra note 57, at 29 ("[T]he Canadian income tax system ... has used
the individual as the tax unit from the outset. However, it has consistently focused special
benefits on married couples only, and those benefits have increased in number and value
over the last century." (emphasis omitted)); Crago, supra note 74, at 4 ("In the years since
the Carter Commission, there has been a gradual change in the income tax system to
recognize the family as the unit of taxation."); Dulude, supra note 59, at 109 ("The basic
principle of individual taxation is that each person pays tax on his or her own income, with
deductions or credits being used to recognize family responsibilities.").
80 CAN. REVENUE AGENCY, FORM TI GENERAL 2008: INCOME TAX AND BENEFIT
RETURN 1 (2008), available at http://www.nevcon.com/forms/2008-t 1 -general.pdf.
81 ITA § 248(1).
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individual application of the tax, I downloaded a full copy of the federal Income
Tax Act from the Canadian Department of Justice's Web site.82 I then did a few
quick searches for selected words and phrases indicative of a concern with marital
and/or familial status. This (admittedly unscientific) search yielded 604 hits for the
word "spouse," 523 hits for the phrase "common-law" (as in common-law partner
or common-law partnership), 27 hits for the word "married," 475 hits for the word
"child" (or its plural, "children"), and 128 hits for the word "family."" Quite
understandably, then, one commentator has labeled the Canadian federal income
tax as being based on "a modified-individual tax unit." 84
In the Canadian income tax system, marital or familial status can either
increase or decrease tax benefits, depending upon "the amount of income of each
of the partners, the nature of that income and the relative distribution of that
income as between the partners."85 It may work to decrease tax benefits, for
example, when calculating the goods and services tax/harmonized sales tax credit
and the Canada child tax benefit, both of which are phased out based on the
combined income of spouses or common-law partners. In addition, for purposes
of the exclusion for gain on the disposition of a principal residence, each family is
limited to designating a single principal residence at any given time.87 Conversely,
82 ITA, available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/PDF/Statute/I-3.3.pdf.
83 For a similar tabulation, see LAHEY, supra note 57, app. A. Lahey states that this
tabulation indicates that "[a]t least a hundred federal income tax provisions look not only to
spousal status but to other forms of relationship, including 'family' relationship." Id. at 5
n. 10. Likewise, the Law Commission of Canada has explained:
The Income Tax Act contains a bewildering variety of provisions that refer
to the personal relationships of the individual taxpayer. For example, there are
over 200 provisions in the Act and the regulations to the Act that contain
references to the phrase (or variations of it) "spouse and common-law partner."
The Act contains over 500 references to the concept of "related person," which
includes, basically, all persons related by blood or adoption to the taxpayer and
their spouses and common-law partners. These provisions are so diverse that it
is difficult to generalize about the reasons why relational status is used in many
of them.
BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 66,-at 72.
84 Crago, supra note 74, at 6; see LAHEY, supra note 57, at 2 ("[T]he Canadian
individual model has become a hybrid that resembles the joint or marital model in many
regards"); id. at 30 ("Retaining the individual as the tax unit on paper, the Canadian Income
Tax Act contains nearly 200 provisions that depend in some way on adult relationships.").
85 Claire F.L. Young, Taxing Times for Lesbians and Gay Men: Equality at What
Cost?, 17 DALHOUSIE L.J. 534, 546 (1994); see Crago, supra note 74, at 5-6.
86 ITA § 122.5 (goods and services tax rebate); id. §§ 122.6-.64 (Canada child tax
benefit); see LAHEY, supra note 57, at 108-09, 113 (describing the operation of the penalty
effect of the goods and services tax credit).
87 ITA §§ 40(2)(b), 54.
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marital or familial status may increase tax benefits; for example, a taxpayer who is
married or in a common-law partnership is allowed a tax credit for support of a
spouse or common-law partner.88 Spouses and common-law partners may also
elect to have one spouse or partner include in income the dividends received from
Canadian corporations by the other spouse or partner, if doing so will increase the
amount of the credit for the support of spouses and common-law partners. 89
B. Allocating Expenses
In terms of the allocation of expenses between spouses and common-law
partners, the ITA sometimes permits one spouse or common-law partner to receive
an allowance for expenses incurred by, or on behalf of, the other spouse or
common-law partner (or even another family member).90 For example, the ITA
allows certain clergy members a clergy residence deduction, and it allows certain
railway workers a deduction for meals and lodging that they provide to a spouse,
common-law partner, or a related dependent while they live away from home. 91 A
deduction is also allowed for certain business- and education-related moves of the
taxpayer and members of the taxpayer's household.9 2 An exemption is allowed for
certain fringe benefits (e.g., employer-provided medical and dental insurance and
counseling services) provided to persons related to the taxpayer. 9 3 Furthermore, a
tax credit may be claimed for medical expenses paid for care provided to a spouse,
common-law partner, or minor child of the taxpayer.94
In some cases, an expense is (or may be) allocated between spouses or
common-law partners. For instance, the deduction for child-care expenses is
generally allocated to the spouse or common-law partner with lower income.
Permissive allocation exists with regard to several nonrefundable tax credits. For
example, apportionment of the adoption expense and child fitness tax credits is left
88 Id. § 118(l)(a); see LAHEY, supra note 57, app. F at 140 (listing income tax
subsidies for support of an economically dependent spouse).
89 ITA § 82(3).
90 For a fuller listing of these allowances, see LAHEY, supra note 57, app. G at 141.
9' ITA § 8(1)(c), (e); see also id. § 251(2) (definition of "related person").
92 Id. § 62; see also id. § 248(1) (defining "eligible relocation").
9 Id. § 6(l)(a)(iv); see also id. § 251(2) (definition of "related person"); LAHEY,
supra note 57, at 90 n.144 (indicating that the list of excludible fringe benefits "includes
extended hospitalization, drug, nursing, dental, optical, or medical care plans; education
benefits such as tuition waivers; insurance coverage; employee discounts; survivor
benefits; death benefits; employer-financed housing; and low interest or interest-free loans
for various purposes").
94 ITA § 118.2.
95 Id. § 63. For an explanation of this provision, see CAN. REVENUE AGENCY,
INFORMATION ABOUT CHILD CARE EXPENSES (2008), available at http://www.cra-
arc.gc.calformspubs/prioryear/t778/t778-08e.pdf (explaining how to complete FORM T778,
CHILD CARE EXPENSES DEDUCTIONS FOR 2008).
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to the parents.96 In addition, the unused portion of certain credits may be
transferred from the lower-income spouse or common-law partner to the higher-
income spouse or common-law partner. The credits eligible for such a transfer
include the unused portion of the child, age, pension, and disability tax credits as
well as the unused portion of the tuition, education, and textbook tax credits (with
the unused portion of these latter, education-related credits also being eligible for
transfer to the taxpayer's parent or grandparent). 7
C. Interspousal Transfers of Property
Marital status may also be relevant in determining a taxpayer's gains on the
disposition of capital property. Capital gains have only been subject to tax in
Canada since 1972.8 At present, a taxpayer's "taxable capital gain" is equal to
one-half of the capital gain from the disposition of the property.99 The amount of
the "capital gain" (or, conversely, "capital loss") is equal to the proceeds of
disposition less the sum of (1) the adjusted cost base of the property and (2) selling
expenses. 00 Upon the disposition of personal-use property, the taxpayer's adjusted
cost base is deemed to be equal to the greater of $1,000 or the taxpayer's actual
adjusted cost base, and the taxpayer's proceeds of disposition are deemed to be
equal to the greater of $1,000 or the actual proceeds of disposition.101
96 ITA §§ 118.01(3), .03(3).9 7 Id. §§ 118.8-.9.
98 Daniel Sandler, The Adventure in Venture Capital: Capital Gains vs. Ordinary
Income, 42 TAX NOTES INT'L 621, 622-23 (2006) ("Canada's original income tax
legislation in 1917 and subsequent income tax acts did not include capital gains and losses
until they were specifically added to the tax base in 1972 as part of a major tax reform."). It
appears that drawing the line between capital gains and income gains in Canada is as
nebulous as drawing the line between capital gains and ordinary income in the United
States. See id. at 626 ("Canada .. . does not adequately distinguish between assets held on
capital account and those held on business account."); e.g., CAN. REVENUE AGENCY,
T4037(E), CAPITAL GAINS 5-6 (2008) available at http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/formspubs/
prioryear/t4037/t4037-08e.pdf (defining "capital property"); CAN. REVENUE AGENCY, IT-
218R, PROFIT, CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES FROM THE SALE OF REAL ESTATE, INCLUDING
FARMLAND AND INHERITED LAND AND CONVERSION OF REAL ESTATE FROM CAPITAL
PROPERTY TO INVENTORY AND VICE VERSA (1986), available at http://www.cra-
arc.gc.ca/E/pub/tp/it218r/it218r-e.html (highlighting the subjective, fact-specific nature of
the capital versus income distinction); CAN. REVENUE AGENCY, IT-479R, TRANSACTIONS
IN SECURITIES (1984), available at http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/E/pub/tp/it479r/it479r-e.html
(same); CAN. REVENUE AGENCY, IT-459, ADVENTURE OR CONCERN IN THE NATURE OF
TRADE (1980), available at http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/E/pub/tp/it459/it459-e.html (same).
9 ITA § 38(a).
'oo Id. § 40(l)(a)(i).
'o1 Id. § 46(1); see also id. § 54 (defining "personal-use property"). If personal-use
property that would ordinarily be disposed of as a set having a fair market value greater
than $1,000 is "disposed of by more than one disposition so that all of the properties have
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A "disposition" occurs not only when there is a "transaction or event entitling
a taxpayer to proceeds of disposition of the property"1 02 (e.g., a sale of the
property, the payment of compensation for the lawful or unlawful taking of the
property, or the payment of compensation for the destruction of the property),'0 3
but also upon the taxpayer's death or the making of an inter vivos gift. 104 In the
case of gifts, bequests, and inheritances, the proceeds of disposition received by
the transferor and the adjusted cost base of the transferee are both deemed to be
equal to the fair market value of the transferred property. 05
The rules for individuals who are not dealing at arm's length (but are not
making a gift) are not similarly symmetrical, resulting in a potential tax penalty for
engaging in transfers at other than fair market value in such situations. In the case
of a disposition for less than fair market value between persons not dealing at
arm's length, the proceeds of disposition received by the transferor are deemed to
be equal to the fair market value of the transferred property (i.e., more than the
actual amount paid), but the adjusted cost base is not similarly adjusted (i.e., it is
left at the amount paid by the transferee), resulting in the potential for double
taxation.10 6 Conversely, in the case of a disposition for more than fair market value
between persons not dealing at arm's length, the adjusted cost base of the
transferee is deemed to be equal to the fair market value of the property (i.e., less
than the actual amount paid), but the proceeds of disposition received by the
transferor are not similarly adjusted (i.e., they are left at the amount paid by the
transferee), again resulting in the potential for double taxation.'0 7 For this purpose,
individuals who are related by blood, marriage, common-law partnership, or
adoption are deemed to be related persons not dealing with each other at arm's
been acquired by one person or by a group of persons not dealing with each other at arm's
length," then the set of properties is deemed a single item of personal-use property eligible
for only a single application of the $1,000 minimum cost and $1,000 minimum proceeds
provision. Id. § 46(3).
102 Id. § 248(1).
10 3 Id. § 54.
10 Id. § 69(1)(b)(ii) (inter vivos gift); id. § 70(5)(a) (death).
105 Id. § 69(l)(b)(ii) (proceeds of disposition on an inter vivos gift); id. § 69(l)(c)
(cost of transferee upon acquisition by gift, bequest, or inheritance); id. § 70(5)(a)
(proceeds of disposition on death).
106 Id. § 54 (defining "adjusted cost base"); id. § 69(l)(b)(i) (proceeds of disposition
on a non-arm's-length disposition for less than fair market value); id. § 69(l)(c) (deeming
the transferee to have acquired the property for its fair market value in the case of gifts,
bequests, and inheritances, but making no mention of non-arm's-length transactions).
107 Id. § 54 (defining "proceeds of disposition"); id. § 69(l)(a) (cost of property to
transferee); id. § 69(l)(b) (deeming the proceeds of disposition on a transfer for less than
fair market value between persons not dealing at arm's length to be equal to the fair market
value of the property transferred, but making no mention of a transfer for more than fair
market value in such a situation).
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length.108 Whether other, unrelated individuals are dealing with each other at arm's
length is a question of fact.109
In the case of spouses and common-law partners, an automatic rollover rule
applies to effectively (and, as we will see below, electively) defer tax on
interspousal transfers of capital property. Such interspousal transfers include
transfers incident to the dissolution of the relationship and transfers by reason of
the death of one of the spouses or common-law partners.o Interspousal transfers
covered by the automatic rollover rule also include transfers to inter vivos or
testamentary spousal trusts under the terms of which (1) the spouse or common-
law partner must be entitled to receive all trust income that arises prior to her death
and (2) no person other than the spouse or common-law partner may obtain the use
of trust income or capital prior to her death."' This allows the transferor spouse or
common-law partner to determine the ultimate beneficiary of the property
transferred in trust while still retaining the benefit of the automatic rollover.!1 2
Under the automatic rollover rule, the transferor spouse or common-law
partner is deemed to have disposed of the property for an amount equal to its
adjusted cost base in her hands, and the transferee spouse or common-law partner
is deemed to have acquired the property for an amount equal to its adjusted cost
base in the hands of the transferor.113 Accordingly, under the rollover rule, the
08 Id. § 251(1)(a), (2)(a).
109 Id. § 251(c). For guidance on the factors to be taken into account in making this
determination, see CAN. REVENUE AGENCY, IT-419R2, MEANING OF ARM'S LENGTH
22-26 (2004), available at http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/E/pub/tp/it419r2/it419r2-e.html.
'10 ITA § 70(6) (transfers at death); id. § 73(1)-(1.1) (inter vivos transfers). For
purposes of determining the ownership of community property, the ITA provides that (1)
property owned by one of the spouses or common-law partners before it became subject to
the community property regime is treated as owned by that spouse and (2) all other
property is treated as owned by the spouse or common-law partner who has administration
of the property. Id. § 248(22). If property treated as owned by one spouse or common-law
partner prior to the dissolution of the relationship is owned by the other after the
dissolution of that relationship, then there is a deemed transfer of the property between the
spouses or common-law partners immediately prior to the dissolution of the relationship.
Id. § 248(23). In the case of dissolution of the relationship by reason of the death of one of
the spouses or common-law partners, then any property transferred or distributed to the
surviving spouse or common-law partner is considered to be transferred as a consequence
of death. Id. § 248(23.1).
" Id. § 70(6) (transfers at death); id. § 73(1)-(1.1) (inter vivos transfers).
112 Brooks, supra note 78, at 77. These spousal trusts strongly resemble the qualified
terminable interest property (QTIP) trusts that can be created for U.S. federal estate and gift
tax purposes. I.R.C. §§ 2056(b)(7), 2523(f) (2006). They also suffer from the same
infirmities as QTIP trusts. See Brooks, supra note 78, at 77 n.95 (describing spousal trusts
as analogous to the U.S. QTIP trusts and referring the reader to Wendy Gerzog, The
Marital Deduction QTIP Provisions: Illogical and Degrading to Women, 5 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 301 (1995), for a feminist critique of QTIP trusts).
"' ITA § 70(6) (transfers at death); id. § 73(l)-(1.1) (inter vivos transfers).
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transferor's capital gain on the transfer will be zero, and taxation of the gain will
be deferred until the transferee disposes of the property.1 4 Nevertheless, the
transferor (or the transferor's executor, in the case of a deceased transferor) may
elect out of the automatic rollover rule and have the normal capital gain rules
described in the previous paragraph apply to the transaction." 5
D. Attribution of Income
To prevent de facto income splitting, the Canadian tax system "has the most
restrictive rules on assignment of income."' 16 A taxpayer who transfers a right to
income to a person with whom she is not dealing at arm's length' 17 will be required
to include the assigned amount in her own income, if that amount would have been
included in her income had the assignment not been made."1 In addition, if a
taxpayer directs a payment to be made (or property to be transferred) to another
person "for the benefit of the taxpayer or as a benefit that the taxpayer desired to
have conferred on the other person," then the taxpayer must include that payment
(or property) in her own income to the extent that it would have been so included
had the payment (or transfer of property) been made directly to her." 9
Income or loss from property that a taxpayer transferred or loaned (directly or
indirectly) to her spouse or common-law partner (or to someone who later became
her spouse or common-law partner) is attributed back to the taxpayer.120 This rule
applies equally to property substituted for the property transferred or loaned by the
taxpayer.121 Similar rules apply to income or loss from property that a taxpayer
114 In the case of a transfer of a wholly owned principal residence from one spouse or
common-law partner to another to which the automatic rollover rule applies, the exclusion
for gain on the disposition of a principal residence is applied as if (1) the transferee had
owned the property during the time that it was owned by the transferor and (2) the
transferee had used the property as a principal residence during the period that the
transferor so used it. Id. § 40(4).
.s Id. § 70(6.2) (transfers at death); id. § 73(1) (inter vivos transfers).
11 AULT ET AL., supra note 62, at 267.
117 See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
"' ITA § 56(4).
"
9 Id. § 56(2).
120 Id. § 74.1(1).
121 Id. This rule does not, however, apply to income from property purchased with
income attributed to the taxpayer. As the Canada Revenue Agency explains:
Income or loss derived from the investment or other use of the income
from transferred property is not attributed to the transferor and thus for income
tax purposes is income or loss of the transferee. For example, interest on any




transferred or loaned (directly or indirectly) to a minor who either does not deal
with the taxpayer at arm's lengthl22 or is the taxpayer's niece or nephew.12 3
Capital gains and losses from the disposition of property that a taxpayer
transferred or loaned (directly or indirectly) to her spouse or common-law partner
(or to someone who later became her spouse or common-law partner) are attributed
back to the taxpayer.124 This rule applies equally to property substituted for the
property transferred or loaned by the taxpayer, resulting in the attribution to the
taxpayer of capital gains and losses on the disposition of the substituted
property. 12 5 Similar rules generally do not, however, apply to transfers or loans of
property to minors.1
26
These income/loss and capital gain/loss attribution rules are buttressed with
antiavoidance rules. Accordingly, a taxpayer cannot circumvent these attribution
rules through the interposition of a trust, the use of back-to-back loan arrangements
or loan guarantees involving third parties, or the repayment of existing
indebtedness with property that the taxpayer has transferred or loaned. 127
Furthermore, where an interest-free or low-interest loan is made between
individuals not dealing at arm's length (regardless of age), then the income from
the loaned property, from property acquired with the loaned property, or property
substituted for such property is attributed to the lender if "one of the main reasons
,,128for making the loan or incurring the indebtedness was to reduce or avoid tax.
Yet, there are exceptions to the application of.these attribution rules. The
attribution rules do not apply to property that the taxpayer has transferred (or to
property substituted for transferred property) if the fair market value of the
property transferred equals the fair market value of the property received in
exchange. 129 If the consideration received upon such a transfer includes debt, then
the exception from the attribution rules will not apply unless (1) the interest
charged on the debt at least equals the lesser of a prescribed interest rate or an
CAN. REVENUE AGENCY, IT-51 IR, INTERSPOUSAL AND CERTAIN OTHER TRANSFERS AND
LOANS OF PROPERTY T 6 (1994), available at http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/E/pub/tp/it51 Ir/it
51 1r-e.html. Thus, so-called second-generation income is exempt from attribution.
122 See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
121 ITA § 74.1(2).
124 Id. § 74.2(1).
125 See id. § 248(1), (5) (defining "property" and "substituted property"); CAN.
REVENUE AGENCY, IT-5 11 R, supra note 121, T 27 (explaining the rule and providing an
example where capital gains from the disposition of substituted property were attributed to
the taxpayer who initially transferred the property).
126 See CAN. REVENUE AGENCY, IT-51 1R, supra note 121, $T 3-4 (making no
mention of transfers or loans to anyone other than spouses and common-law partners); cf
ITA § 75.1 (applying such rules in the context of transfers of interests in family farms or
fishing businesses).
127 ITA §§ 74.1(3), 74.5(6), (7), (9).
128 Id. § 56(4.1)-(4.3).129 Id. § 74.5(l)(a).
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arm's-length interest rate and (2) the interest is paid within 30 days of the close of
every taxable year.' 30 In the case of a fair market value transfer of property to a
taxpayer's spouse or common-law partner, the taxpayer cannot qualify for the
exception from the attribution rules unless the taxpayer elects out of the application
of the automatic rollover rules (discussed above).' 3 '
Similarly, the attribution rules will not apply to property that the taxpayer has
loaned (or property substituted for loaned property) if (1) the taxpayer charges
interest on the loan at a rate that at least equals the lesser of a prescribed interest
rate or an arm's-length interest rate and (2) the interest is paid within 30 days of
the close of every taxable year.13 2 There is also an exception from the attribution
rules in the case of married taxpayers or taxpayers in a common-law partnership
who live separate and apart from each other because of the breakdown of their
relationship. 3 3
E. Permitted Income Splitting
Notwithstanding this elaborate set of attribution rules, the ITA does permit a
certain amount of de jure income splitting to spouses and common-law partners. 134
For instance, support payments made by one spouse or common-law partner to the
other while living separate and apart because of the breakdown of their relationship
are deductible by the payer and includible in the income of the payee.135 In
addition, one spouse or common-law partner may make deductible contributions to
a registered retirement savings plan for the other spouse or common-law partner,
who will then be taxed (possibly at a lower marginal rate) on payments from the
plan.13 6 And, more recently, spouses and common-law partners have been given
the option of electing to split pension income for tax purposes."'
130 Id. § 74.5(l)(b).
131 Id. § 74.5(1)(c). For a discussion of the automatic rollover rules, see supra text
accompanying notes 113-15.
132 Id. § 74.5(2).
131 Id. § 74.5(3).
134 Lisa Philipps, Income Splitting and Gender Equality: The Case for Incentivizing
Intra-Household Wealth Transfers, in CHALLENGING GENDER INEQUALITY IN TAX POLICY
MAKING: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Kimberley Brooks et al. eds., forthcoming)
(manuscript at 4-7) (on file with author).
15 ITA §§ 56(1)(b), 56.1, 60(b). In contrast, child support payments are neither
deductible by the payer nor includible in the income of the payee. Id. §§ 56(1)(b), 56.1,
60(b).
1 Id. §§ 74.5(12)(a), 146(5.1); see LAHEY, supra note 57, app. G (listing income tax
provisions that allow spouses to split incomes and transfer deductions between themselves
as well as listing provisions that shelter benefits provided to a spouse from taxation).
11 ITA § 60.03.
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In addition, in Neuman v. Minister ofNational Revenue, the Supreme Court of
Canada approved of "dividend sprinkling."' 38 In Neuman, the taxpayer had created
a holding company to which he transferred shares of stock that he owned in
another company.139 He received shares of one class of the holding company's
stock in exchange for this contribution of operating company stock.14 0 The
taxpayer's wife then contributed cash for shares of another class of the holding
company's stock.141 The taxpayer's wife became the sole director of the holding
company and, in that capacity, had discretion in paying dividends on these two
classes of stock.142 After the holding company received a dividend from the
operating company, the taxpayer's wife declared a dividend of $5,000 on her
husband's stock and a dividend of $14,800 on her own stock, effectively splitting
the income from the operating company between the two of them.14 3 (It is worth
noting that the taxpayer's wife promptly lent the $14,800 dividend that she
received to her husband-a loan that he had not repaid prior to her death some six
years later.'") The Supreme Court of Canada held that this income-splitting
arrangement would be respected for tax purposes.14 5 Following this decision, the
ITA was amended to curtail dividend sprinkling to minors, but the Supreme Court
of Canada's decision in Neuman was otherwise left intact.14 6
* F. Attribution of Ownership
At times, marital status can be relevant to the determination of the ownership
of property or control of entities. For example, a taxpayer is denied a deduction for
a "superficial" loss, which combines elements of the U.S. "wash sale" rules and the
loss disallowance rules in §§ 267 and 1041 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code.147
Akin to a wash sale, a "superficial" loss occurs when a taxpayer disposes of
property at a loss and then the taxpayer or an "affiliated" person reacquires that
same property-or property identical to it-within a short time frame.14 8 For this
purpose, spouses and common-law partners are the only individuals who are
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 770 (Can.); see generally David G. Duff, Neuman and Beyond:
Income Splitting, Tax Avoidance, and Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court of
Canada, 32 CAN. Bus. L.J. 345 (1999).
139 Neuman, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 770, paras. 3, 5.
140 Id. para. 5.
141 id
142 Id. para. 6.
143 Id. para. 7.
'" Id..para. 8.
145 Id. para. 65.
146 ITA § 120.4.
147 Id. § 40(2)(g)(i). For the U.S. wash sale rules, see I.R.C. § 1091 (2006). Where §
267 and § 1041 overlap, § 1041 takes precedence. Id. § 267(g).
148 ITA § 54.
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deemed to be "affiliated" persons.14 9 Thus, the acquisition of identical property by
the taxpayer's spouse or common-law partner is attributed to the taxpayer and
treated as if the taxpayer had acquired the substituted property himself. More
broadly, through its application to the acquisition of the "same" property, the
superficial loss rule also operates to disallow capital losses on the transfer of
property from one spouse or common-law partner to the other, as do §§ 267 and
1041 in the U.S. federal income tax.
Furthermore, in determining whether an individual and a corporation are
"affiliated" with each other, the ownership of spouses and common-law partners is
aggregated and tested together to determine whether this "affiliated group of
persons" is in control of the corporation. 50 If the spouses or common-law partners
are in control of the corporation, this may result in the denial of a deduction for a
capital loss resulting from the redemption of one of the spouse's or common-law
partner's stock in the corporation."'
G. "Beyond Conjugality"
In 2001, the Law Commission of Canada issued a report titled Beyond
Conjugality: Recognizing and Supporting Close Personal Adult Relationships.15 2
In that report, the Law Commission recommended a wide-ranging reconsideration
of the role of relationships in Canadian law. As the Law Commission put it, "It is
time to try to imagine a legislative regime that more effectively accomplishes its
goals by relying less on whether people are living in particular kinds of
relationships."
To achieve this end, the Law Commission proposed that a new methodology
be adopted "for assessing any existing or proposed law that employs relational
terms to accomplish its objectives." 54 This methodology consists of a four-step
analysis:
First Question: Are the objectives of the law legitimate?
If not, should the law be repealed or fundamentally revised?
Second Question: Do relationships matter?
If the law's objectives are sound, are the relationships included in
the law important or relevant to the law's objectives?
149 Id. § 251.1(1).
'"
0 Id. § 25 1.1(1)(b), (3).
"' Id. § 40(3.6).
152 BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 66. In 2006, the conservative government of
Prime Minister Stephen Harper eliminated funding for the Law Commission of Canada,
effectively shuttering the commission. Steven Chase, Ottawa's $2-Billion Hit List, THE
GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto, Canada), Sept. 26, 2006, at Al; John Ibbitson, Fatal Cuts to Law
Panel Deeply Ideological, THE GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto, Canada), Sept. 28, 2006, at A4.




Third Question: If relationships matter, can individuals be
permitted to designate the relevant relationships themselves?
Could the law allow individuals to choose which of their close
personal relationships they want to be subject to the particular law?
Fourth Question: If relationships matter, and self-designation is
not feasible or appropriate, is there a better way to include relationships?
If relationships do matter, and public policy requires that the law
delineate the relevant relationships to which it applies, can the law be
revised to more accurately capture the relevant range of relationships? 5
After describing its methodology, the Law Commission applied the iethodology
to a series of different areas of Canadian law, including marine liability,
employment, immigration, evidence, bankruptcy, banking, and pensions.
The Law Commission devoted a lengthy section of its report to an evaluation
of aspects of the Income Tax Act.156 The Law Commission first revisited the
debate over individual versus joint filing and concluded that individual filing was
both preferable and more consistent with its law reform project.' 7 The Law
Commission then turned to an examination of several specific ITA provisions
using the methodology described above. It is worth reviewing parts of the Law
Commission's evaluation of specific ITA provisions to obtain a sense of how its
methodology applies in the tax context. Thus, by way of example, I summarize
below the Law Commission's evaluation of (1) three dependent care credits, (2)
the credit for support of a low-income spouse or common-law partner, and (3) the
automatic rollover rule that applies to interspousal transfers of capital property.
1. Dependent Care Credits
The ITA contains three separate credits for the care of individuals who are
dependent on the taxpayer by reason of age or disability.' 8 Each of these credits
has its own particular requirements; nevertheless, each credit requires that the
dependent individual be in some way related to the taxpayer. In answering its first
question, the Law Commission noted that each credit is intended to reflect that
taxpayers supporting individuals who are dependent upon them by reason of age or
's Id. at xii-xiii. For a more detailed description of the analysis required by each of
these questions, see id. at 30-36.
6Id. at 63-89.
157 Id. at 71 ("In summary, our tax system is and should continue to be premised on
the individual as the basic unit of taxation. Family-based taxation is not consistent with the
control theory underlying Canada's income tax, nor is it consistent with the empirical
evidence demonstrating the unpredictable degree of income sharing in families. Individual
taxation is consistent with the control theory and has the advantages of administrative
simplicity and neutrality regarding personal relationships.").
S158 ITA § 1 18(1)(b) (wholly dependent person credit); id. § 1 18(l)(c.1) (in-home care
of relative credit); id. § I 18(1)(d) (dependents credit).
2010] 635
UTAH LAW REVIEW
disability have a reduced ability to pay taxes. 59 In addition, these credits "provide
income support to families supporting and caring for relatives unable to support
themselves."16 0 Upon reflection, the Law Commission concluded that both of these
objectives are legitimate, and it further concluded, in answer to its second question,
that relationships are relevant to these objectives.161 In answer to its third question,
the Law Commission maintained that relying on taxpayers to identify those
dependency relationships that reduce their ability to pay tax "may not be feasible
since the potential for abuse is too great." 62 Finally, in answer to its fourth
question, the Law Commission found that
the Income Tax Act could be revised to more accurately capture the
relevant range of dependency relationships . . . . There is no justification
for limiting entitlement to these credits to persons with dependants who
are relatives, or to dependants with whom a taxpayer lives. Taxpayers
who support dependents-whether related or not, whether living in the
same hou sehold or not, whether wholly or partially dependent-should
be entitled to claim the tax credits because the provision of support itself
reduces the resources they have available to meet their tax obligations.
The credit should be available to taxpayers who have provided financial
support or unpaid caregiving to a person who is dependent by reason of
age, disability or illness.16 3
2. Credit for Support ofa Spouse or Common-Law Partner
The Law Commission also considered the credit for support of a dependent
spouse or common-law partner.'6 The Law Commission concluded that this credit
fails to serve a legitimate objective and, therefore, does not make it past the first
part of its four-part methodology.165 The Law Commission based this conclusion
on the credit's promotion of economic dependency within conjugal relationships,
which "offends against the principle that government should be neutral with
respect to the roles assumed within personal relationships." 6 6 Indeed, the Law
Commission pointed out that the dependency requirement and income limits had
been lifted from the credit during World War II in order to encourage women to
enter the workforce to support the war effort; they were then reinstated after the
war to encourage women to return to the home in order to free up jobs for
159 BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 66, at 72.160 d.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 73.
163 d
' See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
165 BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 66, at 75.
166 Id. at 74.
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returning servicemen.167 The Law Commission also observed that the credit "is
claimed disproportionately by relatively well-off individuals. This should not be
surprising. Generally, middle- and high-income individuals are more able to afford
to support an economically dependent spouse."l 68 The Law Commission further
noted that, far from reducing the ability to pay tax, the household services that the
dependent spouse or common-law partner provides to the taxpayer may actually
increase the ability to pay tax by reducing the services that the taxpayer must
purchase in the marketplace.169 Finally, the Law Commission rejected the
justification that the credit "provides income support to those families in which one
spouse is looking after children in the home or acting as a caregiver for elderly
parents."1 7 0 If this is the purpose of the credit, the Law Commission explained,
then the credit is overinclusive because more than one-half of taxpayers claiming
the credit are not supporting children and "[i]t is impossible to determine in how
many of these cases the dependent spouse is providing care to individuals other
than children." 71 Ultimately, the Law Commission concluded that, "[b]ecause its
primary objective appears to be to promote dependency in personal relationships,
the spouse and common-law partner credit should be repealed."l 7 2
3. Automatic Rollover Rule
With regard to the automatic rollover rule for interspousal transfers of capital
property,17 3 the Law Commission answered its first question by concluding that it
serves legitimate objectives. The Law Commission found that the rollover rule
serves legitimate administrative objectives because (1) shifts of legal title within
conjugal couples do not necessarily reflect shifts in beneficial ownership, (2)
tracing the funds used to acquire property would be difficult, (3) transactions
between spouses and common-law partners often take place on an informal basis
without an understanding of the tax consequences, and (4) taxation of interspousal
property transfers would raise liquidity problems as the couple would have to find
the funds to pay the tax.174 Accordingly, "[t]axing the transfers of capital property
within conjugal relationships would be too costly and intrusive to administer."7
The Law Commission additionally found that the rollover rule "serves the social
policy objective of encouraging, or at least not discouraging, the redistribution of
property within personal relationships."' 7 6
167 id
168 Id. at 75.
69 Id. at 76.
170 id
1' Id. at 76-77.
172 Id. at 77.
173 See supra text accompanying notes I10-15.
174 BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 66, at 87-88:





Having answered its first question affirmatively, the Law Commission
similarly answered its second question when it stated that "[t]he entangled kinds of
economic interdependencies that characterize close personal relationships are the
very raison d'itre of the rollover rules."'" The Law Commission then summarily
answered its third question negatively when it asserted that "[s]elf-selection of the
appropriate range of relationships is obviously not a feasible option."' 78 (At this
juncture, it is worth noting that I take strong issue with this unexplained and
uninterrogated conclusion in developing my own proposal below.) Finally, in
answer to its fourth question, the Law Commission recommended that the rollover
provision be revised to more accurately capture the relevant range of relationships
by being made. applicable "to any relationship between persons living together in
economically interdependent relationships."17 9
Having now been given a flavor of the Canadian individual income tax
system as well as a glimpse of the Law Commission's view of how that tax system
might be altered to move "beyond conjugality" and toward the recognition (where
relevant) of the broad range of relationships that actually exist in society, we can
now turn to formulating a proposal for such a system that fits the U.S. tax
environment.
IV. DESIGNING AN INCLUSIVE U.S. INDIVIDUAL TAX FILING SYSTEM
A. Background
In building an individual tax filing system that is more inclusive and flexible,
the focus will be on achieving a balance between, as Julie Nelson has put it,
"individuation" and "relation."' 80 The proposal set forth below relies upon a
conception of people "as differentiated individuals who are also interdependent
and connected."' 8 ' Thus, at certain points the focus will be on the taxpayer as an
177 Id. at 89.
178 id.
179 d
180 JULIE A. NELSON, FEMINISM, OBJECTIVITY AND EcoNOMICS 16 (1996).
1 Id. As Nelson explains later in the context of rethinking the taxable unit from a
feminist perspective:
[I]solation and engulfmnent form the "negative complementarity" of the
separation/connection dualism. The positive aspect of separation is the definition
of individual identity; but taken too far, that is, unbalanced by a recognition of
necessary social connections, the myth of the isolated, completely independent
unit rears its head. The positive aspect of connection is the recognition of
relationship to others; but taken too far, that is, unbalanced by a recognition of
individuality, a person is engulfed (as in coverture) within the definition of the
other. The negative complementarity of isolation and engulfment should be
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individual while at other points it will be on accommodating the economically
interdependent relationships that the individual has entered into.
Before proceeding further, it is worth taking a moment to explain the focus
here on the economically interdependent relationships that individuals enter into:
Naturally, individuals also enter into other types of relationships (e.g., familial,
social, or emotional), and they sometimes enter into relationships with multiple
dimensions (e.g., a relationship that is familial, emotional, and economic). But, in
its application, the income tax is predominantly concemed with the economic
aspects of the relationships that we enter into.182 For this reason, the income tax is
best suited to supporting or accommodating (or, at the very least, to refraining
from interfering with) the economic aspects of relationships. It might be helpful to
recall at this point the simple example that I gave in the introduction to this Article:
While the income tax is well suited to providing incentives for the equal sharing of
financial resources within families, it is not well suited to fostering an atmosphere
of mutual respect within families or to deterring domestic violence.
When accommodating relationships in the tax laws, it is necessary to keep the
purpose and scope of the tax laws in mind. As the Law Commission of Canada has
explained:
Since laws have different objectives, it follows that the definition of the
relevant relationships should differ as we move from one law to another.
For example, economic dependence or interdependence is the most
important relational attribute for purposes of a law that seeks to respond
to the economic consequences of the breakdown of a relationship.
Emotional intimacy is the most impottant relational attribute to be
considered by a law that seeks to protect the value of trust and candour
in intimate relationships. Relational definitions that do not focus on the
relevant factual attributes of relationships will miss their mark,
replaced by the positive complementarity of individuation and relation. Persons
are conceived as individuals in relation.
Id. at 99. To implement this notion of individuals in relation, Nelson proposes the adoption
of the "individual earner plus his or her dependents" as a quasi-taxable unit. Id. at 110. The
income of the individuals comprising this quasi-taxable unit would not be aggregated, but
the individual earner would be allowed a deduction for his or her dependents, a class of
persons that would be limited to those unable to support themselves by reason of age
(whether young or old) or disability. Id. Nelson's conception of the individual in relation to
others is strongly influenced by the hegemony of the traditional family, see id..at. 110-12,
and, consequently, is not as broad as the view taken in this Article of the individual in
relation to others.
182 For an argument that noneconomic factors should be taken into account in
assessing the fairness of a tax, see generally Infanti, supra note 13, and Infanti, Taxing
Civil Rights Gains, supra note 1. See also supra note 13 (discussing how the focus of this
Article is consistent with that approach).
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excluding some relationships that ought to be included, and including
some relationships that ought to be excluded. Thus, carefully tailoring
relational definitions to the objectives of particular laws will eliminate
inequalities and enable laws to accomplish their objectives more
effectively. 183
It is thus no wonder that the Law Commission's recommendation for reform of the
Canadian automatic rollover rule targeted "persons living together in economically
interdependent relationships," 84 while its recommendations for reform in other
areas of the law were not so limited.
The justifications proffered for treating married different-sex couples as a
taxable unit provide further evidence that economic interdependence is the most
important relational attribute for purposes of the tax laws.' 85 As discussed above,
these justifications principally rely upon the couple's presumed sharing of financial
resources and their acting as a single economic unit.186 The justifications proffered
for various antiabuse rules likewise focus on economic interdependence. For
example, the U.S. Supreme Court identified the common thread running through
I.R.C. § 267 as an economic one:
[The predecessor of § 267] states an absolute .prohibition-not a
presumption-against the allowance of losses on any sales between the
members of certain designated groups. The one common characteristic
of these groups is that their members, although distinct legal entities,
generally have a near-identity of economic interest. It is a fair inference
that even legally genuine intra-group transfers were not thought to result,
usually, in economically genuine realizations of loss, and accordingly
that Congress did not deem them to be appropriate occasions for the
allowance of deductions.18 7
' BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 66, at 36.
18 See id. at 89 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the Canadian automatic
rollover rule, see supra Part III.G.3.
185 Consequently, commentators who argue for equal treatment of same-sex couples
under the tax laws tend to pick up this argument and rely on it as well. See, e.g., Patricia A.
Cain, Same-Sex Couples and the Federal Tax Laws, 1 LAw & SEXUALITY REv. 97, 130-31
(1991) ("If joint returns are the appropriate reporting device for husband and wife, then I
believe joint returns should be available for same-sex couples who consider themselves just
as committed as married couples and whose household is just as much a single economic
unit.").
186 H.R. REP. No. 98-432, at 1491 (1984); Michael J. McIntyre, Marital Income
Splitting in the Modern World: Lessons for Australia from the American Experience, in
TAX UNITS AND THE TAX RATE SCALE, supra note 78, at 1, 2-4; see also supra Part II.B.
187 McWilliams v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 694, 699 (1947) (footnote omitted).
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Similarly, the Section on Taxation of the American Bar Association submitted this
critique of the constructive ownership rules in § 318 while Congress was
considering their enactment:
[Section 318] assumes a unity of action and of interest within the family
which is frequently lacking, at least where dependency does not exist. It
has been suggested, therefore, that the family should be limited to one's
minor children, spouse and other dependants. It is the experience of
practicing lawyers that one is consulted far more often with respect to
family and partnership squabbles over property than on family plans to
avoid income taxes.188
The Section on Taxation's critique of § 318 is particularly insightful. It not
only draws attention to the fundamental underpinning of the constructive
ownership rules-that is, the desire to amalgamate the ownership of those united
by common economic interests-but it also underscores how often these rules miss
their mark in practice.' 89 Harking back to our earlier discussion of joint versus
individual filing, 190 the problem with the current related party antiabuse rules is
that their drafters have counterfactually assumed that economic interdependence is
either usually or always an attribute of certain noneconomic relationships (e.g.,
marital and familial relationships). As the Law Commission of Canada so
presciently warned, this assumption has resulted in the establishment of rules that
are both overinclusive (i.e., capturing some relationships that lack economic
interdependence) and underinclusive (i.e., failing to capture other relationships that
are marked by economic interdepedence). The task to which we now turn is to
rectify this error by identifying other, more accurate markers for economic
interdependence-the relational attribute that is most relevant to the application of
the tax laws.
B. Transfers of Property
1. Background
In its reexamination of the automatic rollover rule, the Law Commission of
Canada summarily rejected the idea of allowing taxpayers the freedom to identify
their own economically interdependent relationships because it would "obviously"
not be "feasible" to allow individuals to determine when the rollover rule will
'88 Metzger Trust v. Comm'r, 76 T.C. 42, 56-57 (1981).
189 BORIS 1. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 9.02[2] & n.49 (2000) (discussing attempts by
taxpayers to avoid the application of the § 318 constructive ownership rules by
demonstrating hostility among the relevant family members).
190 See supra Part II.D.
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apply. 191 I disagree with the Law Commission's assessment. Not only is it feasible
to allow taxpayers to identify their own economically interdependent relationships,
but asking taxpayers to do so in the context of property transfers will actually serve
as the cornerstone for my proposal for an inclusive U.S. individual filing regime-
a filing regime that accommodates not only the conjugal relationships that
individuals enter into, but all of the economically interdependent.relationships that
taxpayers enter into (e.g., with parents, children, relatives, or friends). For this
reason, we will begin by considering how transfers of property between
economically interdependent persons should be treated for tax purposes. We will
then build on that discussion by considering related questions regarding attribution
of ownership and other antiabuse rules; attribution of income; allocation of
expenses; and, finally, the need to reform other provisions in the tax laws that take
relationships into account.
Let us begin by answering the first two questions posed by the Law
Commission: "Are the objectives of the law legitimate?" and "Do relationships
matter?"1 9 2 Obviously, it is legitimate for an income tax to take account of-and
tax-transfers of property. The more important question of these two is whether
relationships are relevant to the taxation of property transfers. The answer to this
question is that relationships are relevant to the taxation of property transfers.
Indeed, the Law Commission's reexamination of the Canadian automatic rollover
rule indicates that the tax system should refrain from interfering with transfers of
property within certain (namely, economically interdependent) relationships.
Recall that the Law Commission found that the automatic rollover rule serves
legitimate administrative objectives because (1) shifts of legal title within conjugal
couples do not necessarily reflect shifts in beneficial ownership, (2) tracing the
funds used to acquire property can be difficult, (3) transactions between spouses
and common-law partners often take place on an informal basis without an
understanding of the tax consequences, and (4) taxing interspousal property
transfers would raise liquidity problems as the couple would have to find the funds
to pay the tax. 19 3 Much of this reasoning can be applied equally to transfers of
'91 See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
192 See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
193 See supra text accompanying notes 174-76; see also Dulude, supra note 59, at
104-05 (making this point with regard to property transfers within families).
One person's neutrality may, however, be another's invitation for tax avoidance.
Stephanie McMahon has recently argued against individual filing on the ground that it
would introduce untold complexity into the administration of the tax laws because it would
give rise to a return of pre-1948 tax avoidance schemes where property was transferred
between spouses solely for tax avoidance reasons. McMahon, supra note 2, at 8-49. This
argument is unpersuasive for a number of reasons. First, it overlooks the successful
implementation of individual tax filing regimes by other countries. Second, it perpetuates
the hegemony of the traditional family by disregarding the import of transfers outside of
the context of the marital unit (even expanded to include same-sex couples who have
entered into a relationship that is legally recognized under state law). Third, it discounts the
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property in the context of other conjugal-as well as nonconjugal-economically
interdependent relationships. Accordingly, the Law Commission's reasoning
provides support for the position that we should refrain from taxing transfers of
property between economically interdependent persons.
The U.S. tax system already embraces this idea that the tax system should be
neutral with regard to transfers of property within economically interdependent
relationships, albeit in a limited and biased fashion. Sections 1041, 2056, and 2523
of the Internal Revenue Code allow husbands and wives to transfer property to
each other free of income, estate, and gift tax. As I have argued elsewhere, these
provisions-especially when taken together with the income-splitting privilege
afforded by the joint retum 9 4 -make tax a neutral factor when spouses (presumed
to be acting as a single economic unit) decide whether-and, if so, how-to divide
their income and property between them.195 It also affords married different-sex
couples a certain zone of privacy because the Internal Revenue Service has no
reason to inquire into nontaxable events on audit.196 Moreover, even moving
beyond the confines of the married different-sex couple to other family members
real import of shifting legal title within the marital unit, given the ease and prevalence of
divorce nowadays. See Marjorie E. Komhauser, Theory Versus Reality: The Partnership
Model of Marriage in Family and Income Tax Law, 69 TEMP. L. REv. 1413, 1443 (1996)
("Yet, to a large extent, title really does matter, especially given the high divorce rate.");
Philipps, supra note 134, at 15-16 (explaining that having legal title is important to
divorcing women in Canada-notwithstanding the existence of a property equalization
regime there-because of women's possible "lack of access to costly legal advice or to
courts in order to establish or enforce a claim; the difficulty of tracing assets that may be
owned outside the country; pressures to trade child custody for a lesser share of property;
and the exclusion of some intangibles like professional degrees and licenses from what is
considered divisible property; and the legal uncertainty surrounding others such as
unvested pension plan rights"). Fourth, this argument discounts the agency of women
within the marital unit. See id. at 12-13. Fifth, it ignores the fact that the income-splitting
joint return amounts to nothing less than legislatively sanctioned tax avoidance. Through
the joint return, a married owner of property can minimize his taxes by splitting the income
from property without actually parting with control over that property. In contrast,
unmarried taxpayers can achieve such a splitting of income only by actually parting with
control over their property. Finally, this argument overlooks the fact that adopting the
married different-sex couple as the taxable unit has in no way ended attempts by husbands
and wives to manipulate tax rules to their advantage-quite the contrary, it has actually
spawned new opportunities for such manipulation. See I.R.C. § 71(f) (2006) (alimony
frontloading rules); id. § 2056(b) (terminable interest rules); id. § 2523(b) (same); id. §
2056(d) (no marital deduction where surviving spouse is a nonresident alien); id. § 2523(i)
(same), along with each and every provision in the Internal Revenue Code that applies the
related party rules of §§ 267 .and 318, which attribute the ownership of property from one
spouse to the other.
194 I.R.C. § 6013.
195 Anthony C. Infanti, Bringing Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity into the Tax




(who are presumed to have economic ties with each other), the realization
requirement in the U.S. federal income tax has been interpreted in such a way that
neither a gift nor a bequest is a taxable event to the transferor,'97 and, by statute,
the recipient of a gift or bequest is not required to include that gift or bequest in her
gross income.' The estate and gift taxes may impose a hefty levy on such
transfers; however, in the context of the traditional family,'99 these taxes only
apply to an exceedingly small slice of very wealthy transferors,2 00 who can still
benefit from special rules that look to the existence of familial relationships when
either reducing or deferring tax.2 0 1 As a result, the income, estate, and gift tax rules
permit the shifting of substantial amounts of property within most nuclear and
extended traditional families free of concerns about federal taxes.
These rules do not, however, render tax a neutral factor in the shifting of
property among the members of nontraditional families. For the nontraditional
family, it is clear that the benefits of §§ 1041, 2056, and 2523 are off limits
because, by their terms, these provisions apply only to transfers between husbands
202
and wives. Furthermore, as described in the following paragraphs, the
application of other beneficial tax rules concerning gifts and bequests are subject to
significant interpretational issues and doubt when applied to nontraditional
families.
197 2 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES, AND GIFTS T 40.3 (3d ed. 2000).
198 I.R.C. § 102.
'99 See Infanti, Sodomy Statute, supra note 1, at 785-87 (discussing how the gift tax
might apply very differently-and detrimentally-to a same-sex couple or even an
unmarried different-sex couple).
200 I.R.C. § 2010 (unified credit permitting decedents dying in 2009 to transfer $3.5
million worth of property-including certain lifetime gifts-free of estate tax); id. §
2503(b) (gift tax annual exclusion); id. § 2505 (unified credit permitting each taxpayer to
transfer $1 million worth of property free of gift tax); Rev. Proc. 2008-66, § 3.30, 2008-2
C.B. 1107 (setting the gift tax annual exclusion at $13,000 for 2009); see CITIZENS FOR
TAX JUSTICE, LATEST STATE-BY-STATE DATA SHOW WHY OBAMA SHOULD SCALE BACK
His PROPOSAL TO CUT THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX 1 (2008), available at
http://www.ctj.org/pdf/estatetax2008l203.pdf (indicating that "only 0.7 percent of deaths
in 2006 resulted in estate tax liability in 2007"). It is worth noting that, due to
congressional inaction, the estate tax was repealed with respect to decedents dying on or
after January 1, 2010; however, absent congressional action prior to the end of 2010, the
estate tax will be reinstated for decedents dying on or after January 1, 2011. Economic
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, §§ 501, 901(a),
115 Stat. 38, 69, 150.
21 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 2032A (special estate tax valuation rule for certain farming and
business property passed to "qualified heirs"); id. § 6166 (allowing stock owned by family
members to be aggregated for purposes of determining whether to permit the extension of
time to pay estate tax for estates comprised largely of closely held business interests).
202 See I U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (defining "spouse").
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For instance, the income tax exclusion for gifts and bequests does not
embrace all transfers for less than fair market value.203 The exclusion applies only
to a narrower class of transfers; namely, those made out of 'detached and
disinterested generosity,' 'out of affection, respect, admiration, charity or like
impulses."' 2 04 A transfer will not qualify for the exclusion if it "proceeds primarily
from 'the constraining force of any moral or legal duty,' or from 'the incentive of
,,205
anticipated benefit' of an economic nature. And a payment for services
rendered will not qualify as a gift even if the transferor derives no economic
benefit from the payment (the classic example of such a payment being a tip given
after services have already been rendered).206 The distinction drawn between
transfers made out of detached and disinterested generosity, on the one hand, and
those stemming from a moral or legal duty or from the anticipation of some
economic benefit, on the other hand, has led to litigation over whether transfers of
property between unmarried different-sex cohabitants or from a disabled individual
to a caregiver were excludible gifts or taxable payments for services rendered.207
This distinction also casts a pall of uncertainty over the correct income tax
characterization of transfers between other members of nontraditional families. 20 8
The estate and gift taxes only intensify these difficult characterization issues
by employing a different definition of "gift" than that employed for income tax
purposes. 209 For estate and gift tax purposes, a "gift" generally includes any
203 Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) ("This Court has indicated that a
voluntarily executed transfer of his property by one to another, without any consideration
or compensation therefor, though a common-law gift, is not necessarily a 'gift' within the
meaning of the statute."); see Wolder v. Comm'r, 493 F.2d 608, 611-12 (2d Cir. 1974)
(applying Duberstein in interpreting § 102 as it applies to bequests); Braddock v. United
States, 434 F.2d 631, 632 (9th Cir. 1970) (same).
204 Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 285 (quoting Comm'r v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246
(1956), and Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 714 (1952)).
205 Id. (quoting Bogardus v. Comm'r, 302 U.S. 34, 41 (1937)).
206 Id.
207 E.g., Estate of Cavett v. Comm'r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1662 (2000) (unmarried
different-sex cohabitants); Reynolds v. Comm'r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1479 (1999) (unmarried
different-sex cohabitants); Miller v. Comm'r, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 962 (1987) (bequests from
individual disabled by stroke to caregivers); see generally Melvyn B. Frumkes, Taxation of
Same-Sex Marriage and Live-Ins, 22 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 117 (2009).
208 See, e.g., Infanti, Sodomy Statute, supra note 1, at 783-85 (describing the
uncertainty surrounding the correct income tax characterization for transfers between
members of same-sex couples).
209 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 69 n.6 (1962) ("In interpreting the
particular income tax provisions here involved, we find ourselves unfettered by the
language and considerations ingrained in the gift and estate tax statutes.").
Perhaps to assuage the feelings and aid the understanding of affected
taxpayers, Congress might use different symbols to describe the taxable conduct
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transfer for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth. 2 10 This definition gives rise to interpretational issues concerning whether a
transfer was made in exchange for money or money's worth (e.g., property or the
provision of services) or was made in exchange for "[a] consideration not reducible
to a value in money or money's worth, as love and affection, promise of marriage,
etc." 2 1  Furthermore, the estate tax (particularly through its application to property
held in a joint tenancy with right of survivorship by anyone other than a married
couple) and the generation-skipping transfer tax present significant traps for
unwary members of nontraditional families.2 12
2. Elective Nonrecognition Treatment
As mentioned above, where I part company with the Law Commission is in
answering the third of its questions: "If relationships matter, can individuals be
permitted to designate the relevant relationships themselves?" 213 In the context of
its reexamination of the automatic rollover rule, the Law Commission summarily
concluded that it is not feasible to allow taxpayers to identify their economically
interdependent relationships for themselves. I disagree with this conclusion.
Demonstrating that it is possible to answer this question in the affirmative, I have
sketched below the outlines of a tax regime that would both be neutral with regard
to transfers of property within economically interdependent relationships and allow
in the several statutes, calling it a "gift" in the gift tax law, a "gaft" in the
income tax law, and a "geft" in the estate tax law.
Comn'r v. Beck's Estate, 129 F.2d 243, 246 (2d Cir. 1942).
210 See I.R.C. § 2043(a) (2006) (setting forth the extent of the estate tax inclusion
where property is transferred during life but drawn back into the decedent's gross estate at
death, and the transfer during life was for less than an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth); id. § 2053(c)(1)(A) (limiting the deduction for claims against a
decedent's estate to those "contracted bona fide and for an adequate and full consideration
in money or money's worth"); id. § 2512(b) (providing that, "[w]here property is
transferred for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth,
then the amount by which the value of the property exceeded the value of the consideration
shall be deemed a gift").
211 Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (as amended in 1992); see I.R.C. § 2043(b)(1) ("[A]
relinquishment or promised relinquishment of dower or curtesy, or of a statutory estate
created in lieu of dower or curtesy, or of other marital rights in the decedent's property or
estate, shall not be considered to any extent a consideration 'in money or money's
worth."'); Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 (1945) (release of marital rights not consideration
in money or money's worth for gift tax purposes); Comm'r v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303
(1945) (promise of marriage not consideration in money or money's worth for gift tax
purposes); see also Infanti, Sodomy Statute, supra note 1, at 785-87 (discussing the
difficult gift tax characterization issues faced by same-sex couples).
212 Cain, supra note 24, at 692-97.
213 See supra note 155.
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taxpayers to identify their economically interdependent relationships for
themselves.
To work toward the goal of making the proposed U.S. individual tax filing
system neutral with regard to transfers of property within economically
interdependent relationships, I.R.C. § 1041 (which affords nonrecognition
treatment to transfers of property between married different-sex spouses) should be
repealed and the categories of transfers that constitute realization events should be
revisited. Along the lines of the Canadian tax system, all outright transfers of
property at other than fair market value (including gifts and bequests) should be
deemed to be taxable events for income tax purposes-that is, these transfers
should be deemed dispositions of the transferred property in exchange for
consideration equal to the property's fair market value.214 Correlatively, the
transferor of the property should be required to realize and recognize any gain or
loss inherent in the transferred property, and the transferee should take the property
with a fair market value basis.
To accommodate and identify transfers between economically interdependent
individuals, it will be necessary to provide an exception from this default
treatment. In Canada, such an exception is found in the automatic rollover rule.
The automatic rollover rule singles out a certain type of relationship (i.e., the
conjugal couple) and automatically affords transfers between the parties to that
relationship nonrecognition treatment (unless they elect otherwise). The Canadian
approach to accommodating transfers between economically interdependent
individuals is, however, fundamentally inconsistent with the approach taken in this
Article. The Canadian approach is actually more consistent with the current U.S.
joint return system, which singles out a certain relationship (i.e., the traditional
family) and privileges it above all others. For this reason, I have rejected adopting
the Canadian automatic rollover rule as part of this proposal.
Instead, under this proposal, all transferors (and not just conjugal couples, as
in Canada) would be allowed to elect nonrecognition treatment on an outright
transfer of property at other than fair market value (whether made directly to an
individual or indirectly through a trust).2 15 It is worth noting that this proposal
214 This would affect transfers of appreciated property at less than fair market value
by requiring the gain built into the property to be recognized and would likewise affect
transfers of depreciated property at more than fair market value by disallowing artificial
losses (i.e., the portion of the loss attributable to consideration paid in excess of fair market
value).
215 A modified version of this election should be available for part-gift, part-sale
transfers (i.e., for transfers for some consideration, but less than the fair market value of the
property). The election should shield from taxation only the difference between the fair
market value of the property and the amount paid by the transferee. Through basis
adjustments, any untaxed gain should be preserved in the hands of the transferee. Transfers
for greater than the fair market value of the property should be ineligible for the election.
These transfers should be subject to the default rule (i.e., the transferor should be treated as
if she received consideration equal to the fair market value of the property in exchange for
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takes a step beyond even the reform recommended by the Law Commission of
Canada, which would permit only those who live together in an economically
interdependent relationship to benefit from nonrecognition treatment. Under my
proposal, there would be no requirement that the transferor and transferee of the
property live together. There would be no artificial limit on the size or composition
of the economically interdependent relationships recognized for tax purposes or on
the number of transfers for which nonrecognition treatment could be elected.216
There would not even be a formal requirement that the transferor and transferee be
in an economically interdependent relationship. To underscore this point, let me
emphasize that taxpayers would not be required to prove the existence of an
economically interdependent relationship in order to be eligible to make a
nonrecognition election; rather, as described below, having made the election
would be one of the ways of identifying a taxpayer's economically interdependent
relationships.2 17
Indeed, a significant benefit of requiring taxpayers to elect into
nonrecognition treatment is that the election itself serves as a means of identifying
the economically interdependent relationships that the taxpayer has entered into.
This is an improvement over the current practice (here and in Canada) of having
the tax system make an a priori determination about which relationships are (or
ought to be) marked by economic interdependence. Moreover, by having each
individual elect into nonrecognition treatment and identify for herself the
economically interdependent relationships that she has entered into, this proposal
respects the autonomy and liberty of each individual to form the relationships that
the property, and the transferee should take a basis in the property equal to its fair market
value). Any consideration in excess of the fair market value of the property should be
subject to recharacterization in accordance with the surrounding facts and circumstances
(e.g., as a gift, compensation for services rendered, etc.).
It is also worth noting that I have not distinguished here between domestic and cross-
border transfers of property within economically interdependent relationships,
notwithstanding Congress's evident concern with extending nonrecognition treatment to
such transfers. See I.R.C. § 1041(d) (excluding transfers to nonresident alien spouses from
the ambit of the nonrecognition rule of § 1041). Even without the benefit of § 1041, a U.S.
citizen or resident alien can currently make a gift of property to a nonresident alien without
paying tax on the appreciation in that property, despite the fact that the donee may not be
subject to tax on a subsequent sale or disposition of the property. I.R.C. § 871; Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1441-2(b)(2)(i) (as amended in 2008). Making the nonrecognition election available in
this situation would, therefore, honor the economically interdependent relationships of the
taxpayer without opening the door to abuse (or, at the very least, to behavior that we do not
currently consider to be worthy of deterrence).
216 This might sound overly generous; however, please do keep in mind that, under
current U.S. tax rules, an individual is not limited in the number or size of gifts that can be
made without the recognition of gain, see 2 BITTKER & LoKKEN, supra note 197, 1 40.3,
and neither is the recipient of a gift limited in the number or size of gifts that can be
excluded from gross income, I.R.C. § 102.217 See infra Part IV.C.
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she Wishes and rejects the notion that the tax system ought to provide incentives
for entering into a certain type of relationship. 218
For the sake of clarity and to better achieve the goal of identifying
economically interdependent relationships, transfers made in the ordinary course of
the transferor's trade or business, or received in the ordinary course of the
transferee's trade or business, should be ineligible for the election; in other words,
all transfers in the ordinary course of business should be presumed to be made in
exchange for fair market value. 2 19 Transfers of property outside of the context of a
trade or business would be eligible for the nonrecognition election only if the
transfer were made at other than fair market value. This requirement should ensure
that nonbusiness, profit-oriented transactions (e.g., the sale of stock by an investor)
would be ineligible for the nonrecognition election, and should leave only
nonmarket, non-arm's-length transfers-those most likely to be made in the
context of an economically interdependent relationship-eligible for the
nonrecognition election.
Not every nonmarket, non-arm's-length transfer of property will be indicative
of an economically interdependent relationship. By using the election into
nonrecognition treatment as a marker of economic interdependence, this proposal
actually provides taxpayers with an incentive to correctly identify their
economically interdependent relationships. As described more fully below,220
making the nonrecognition election with respect to a transfer will trigger the
application of attribution of ownership and other antiabuse rules that would turn on
the existence of an economically interdependent relationship (rather than on the
existence of certain conjugal or familial relationships, as they do now). In essence,
taxpayers would be given a choice between two mixes of advantages and
disadvantages: On the one hand, a taxpayer could elect the benefit of
nonrecognition treatment, but at the price of triggering disadvantageous attribution
of ownership and antiabuse rules. The application of these attribution and
antiabuse rules would necessarily require both the taxpayer and the transferee of
the property to share information regarding their business and investment
holdings-information that many taxpayers will be loathe to share with anyone
other than someone with whom they share a close, economically interdependent
relationship. On the other hand, a taxpayer could opt for the default treatment of a
deemed disposition at fair market value and pay tax on the transfer of appreciated
property, but rest assured that this transfer alone would not trigger the attribution
of ownership and antiabuse rules, thereby obviating the need for reciprocal
218 Contra The President's Radio Address, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 719 (Apr.
24, 2006) ("[O]ur Tax Code should encourage marriage, not penalize it.").
219 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (as amended in 1992) (providing that, for gift tax
purposes, "a sale, exchange, or other transfer of property made in the ordinary course of
business (a transaction which is bona fide, at arm's length, and free from any donative
intent), will be considered as made for an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth").
?2o See infra Part IV.C.
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disclosure of information regarding business and investment holdings between the
taxpayer and the transferee of the property. 22 1
When a transferor makes a nonrecognition election upon the transfer of
property, the transferee of the property should correlatively take a transferred basis
in the property (thereby preserving any gain or loss inherent in the property at the
time of the transfer for later recognition). Because full ownership of the property
will have shifted, the transferee should be taxed on any income generated by the
property and any gain recognized on a subsequent disposition of the property and
should be allowed a deduction for any loss incurred with respect to the property.222
As Marjorie Kornhauser has explained, studies indicate that, even when financial
resources are pooled, the identity of the holder of legal title to property influences
the measure of control that each person has over the ostensibly pooled resources.2 2 3
This control is important because, as Kornhauser further noted, one of the basic
principles of our tax system is "that the person who controls the income should be
taxed on it even if another benefits."2 24 Moreover, Lisa Philipps has made a strong
feminist case for repealing the Canadian attribution rules as applied to outright
transfers of property, arguing that repeal of these rules "would encourage more
equal sharing of economic resources between men and women . . . would respect
women's agency as property owners and . . . would recognize women's unpaid
221 A taxpayer would be indifferent between recognition and nonrecognition if the
transferred property had a fair market value equal to its basis. In this relatively rare
situation, these rules would fall short of their goal of identifying economically
interdependent relationships. In addition, in the case of depreciated property, these rules
would, at first glance, seem to provide an incentive to opt for the default treatment in order
to obtain a deduction for the loss. However, Part IV.C., infra, addresses the possibility of
taking into account both break-even transfers and transfers of loss property in ascertaining
whether an economically interdependent relationship exists between individuals.
222 See, e.g., Comm'r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 608-10 (1948) (an individual's
assignment of a patent license contract "left him with something more than a memory";
indeed, the individual's continuing ability to control the income from the contracts through
his continued ownership of the underlying patents as well as his stock ownership in the
corporation to which he had nonexclusively licensed the patents justified his having to
include that income in his gross income for federal tax purposes); Corliss v. Bowers, 281
U.S. 376 (1930) (holding that an individual may continue to be taxed on income from
transferred property where the individual has retained the power to revoke the transfer); see
also Crago, supra note 74, at 37-38 (recommending that there be further study to
determine whether repealing the Canadian attribution rules for outright transfers would
result in a more equal sharing of wealth within families); Lahey, Tax Unit, supra note 78,
at 300 (contemplating the repeal of the Canadian attribution rules on property transfers if
the rollover rules could be designed to encourage men to transfer property to women and
children). Contra London, Marital Tax Unit, supra note 78, at 310-11 (opposing repeal of
the Canadian attribution rules as applied to spouses on the ground that it would be "more
regressive than is tolerable" because it would primarily benefit the wealthy).
223 Kornhauser, supra note 36, at 88-91; Komhauser, supra note 193, at 1427-31.
224 Komhauser, supra note 36, at 109.
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contributions to household welfare."225 Admittedly, the person who holds title is
not the only factor that influences control over property; 226 nevertheless, the
shifting of legal title (at least in the context of the outright, no-strings-attached
transfers that are the subject of this proposal) does have the advantage of being
both a meaningful227 and an easily administrable marker of when an individual has
relinquished control of property that can be applied to diverse economically
interdependent relationships.228
Any nonrecognition election should, therefore, be limited to outright transfers
of all or a portion of the property. If a transferor reserves any significant power
over or any interest in ostensibly transferred property, the transfer of the affected
portion of the property should no more be considered "complete" for income tax
purposes than it would generally be for gift tax purposes.229 In the case of such an
incomplete transfer, the transferor would not be required to reckon up her gain or
loss because she would continue to be considered the owner of the affected portion
of the property for income tax purposes. Likewise, notwithstanding the transfer,
the transferor should continue to be subject to tax on income received with respect
to the affected portion of the property as well as on any gain (and, conversely,
should be permitted to deduct any loss) on the disposition of the affected portion of
the property.
By limiting the nonrecognition election to outright transfers, the income tax
would not be an impediment to the shifting of property ownership among
225 Philipps, supra note 134, at 9; see also id. at 9-23 (making this case in detail).
226 See Kornhauser, supra note 193, at 1442-43. The alternative methods that
Iornhauser proposes for allocating income from property are too narrowly tailored to
conjugal couples to be of use in formulating a proposal that is aimed at a far broader and
more diverse group of relationships.
227 Some might contend that the shifting of legal title is not always a meaningful
event, as when a taxpayer transfers legal title to a trustee who will hold the property in trust
for the benefit of the taxpayer. Nevertheless, by confining eligible transfers to outright, no-
strings-attached transfers, as described in the next paragraph of the text above, the mere
transfer of legal title to a trustee who will hold property for the benefit of the taxpayer will
not be eligible for the nonrecognition election-nor will transfers to a trustee where the
taxpayer has retained significant power over the property.
228 To deter purely tax-motivated income-splitting through the transfer of income-
producing property, it may be advisable to adopt a rule along the lines of I.R.C. § 1031(f)
(2006). Thus, if a transferee of property with respect to which a nonrecognition election
was made disposes of that property in a taxable transaction within a specified period after
receiving the property, then any income from the property during the period that the
transferee held it-as well as any gain or loss recognized on the taxable disposition of the
property-should be attributed to the transferor for income tax purposes.
229 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b) (as amended in 1999) (a gift is complete when "the.
donor has so parted with dominion and control as to leave in him no power to change its
disposition, whether for his own benefit or for the benefit of another"). But see id. §
25.2511-2(d) ("A gift is not considered incomplete, however, merely because the donor
reserves the power to change the manner or time of enjoyment.").
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economically interdependent persons. In fact, it might even serve to encourage a
more equal sharing of property by persons in economically interdependent
relationships.2 30 Yet, there would be no encouragement for individuals who own
property to use those with whom they have economically interdependent
relationships as little more than a tax shelter (i.e., by transferring property to them
only for tax purposes). The current joint filing regime provides just such an
incentive, as do the estate and gift tax qualified terminable interest property (QTIP)
rules. 23 1 By avoiding this pitfall, the nonrecognition election would achieve an
appropriate balance between the individual and her connections with others by
accommodating the transfer of property within economically interdependent
relationships but discouraging the exploitation of one party to that relationship by
another.
3. Transfers of Property in Exchange for Services Rendered
It is usually a simple task to ascertain whether property is being transferred in
exchange for other property (or no property at all). It can, however, be more
difficult to determine whether a transfer is being made gratuitously versus in
exchange for services rendered. The difficult dividing line here is between services
for which payment is expected and being made (i.e., where service provider and
service recipient are acting at arm's length) and services for which no explicit
payment is expected or made (i.e., where service provider and service recipient are
not acting at arm's length).232 Property transfers in the former category should be
230 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
231 For a reference to Amy Christian's discussion of this incentive effect of the joint
return, see supra note 44 and accompanying text. The QTIP trust allows married taxpayers
(usually, husbands) to obtain the benefit of the estate and gift tax marital deductions
without actually transferring ownership and control of property to their spouses (usually,
wives). See generally Gerzog, supra note 112. As mentioned earlier, the same criticisms
have been leveled at Canadian spousal trusts. See supra note 112.
Incidentally, a nonrecognition election limited to outright transfers presents the
possibility for a certain measure of simplification in our tax system by harmonizing the
income and gift tax rules for determining whether a transfer is complete and further holds
out the possibility of repealing the complex grantor trust rules found in I.R.C. §§ 671-677.
See Robert T. Danforth, A Proposal for Integrating the Income and Transfer Taxation of
Trusts, 18 VA. TAX REV. 545, 549-50, 602, 604, 619 (1999) (arguing in favor of the
integration of the income tax grantor trust rules and the gift tax rules concerning when a
gift is considered complete, in part because of the resulting simplification benefits
associated with such a move); Jay A. Soled, Reforming the Grantor Trust Rules, 76 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 375, 413-14, 417-18 (2001) (same).
232 Though the paradigmatic example of services provided in a non-arm's-length
context is that of the traditional family with a wife who performs most (if not all)
household services for her husband and children, services might also be provided in a non-
arm's-length context when two siblings live together, when a child cares for a parent, or
when someone cares for an elderly friend or neighbor. Such services can also take the form
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ineligible for the nonrecognition election as regular market-based transactions, but
transfers in the latter category should be eligible for the nonrecognition election
because they bespeak an economically interdependent relationship.2 33
Presently, for income tax purposes, the line between these two categories of
transactions is drawn wholly by reference to the intent of the transferor. As the
U.S. Supreme Court stated in Commissioner v. Duberstein, "the most critical
consideration ... is the transferor's 'intention.' 'What controls is the intention with
which payment, however voluntary, has been made."' 2 34 In the context of this
proposal, a better approach would be to abandon Duberstein and to buttress the
disqualification of transfers made or received in the ordinary course of business
with a further disqualification for property received by the transferee from a
transferor in connection with services rendered in a transaction entered into for
profit (though not connected with a trade or business of the transferee). 23 5 These
of unpaid market labor; for example, when a spouse, partner, or child works in the family
business or assists a family member in performing employment duties without receiving
remuneration. Lisa Philipps, Helping out in the Family Firm: The Legal Treatment of
Unpaid Market Labor, 23 Wis. J.L. GENDER & Soc'Y 65, 66-98 (2008).
233 As Lisa Philipps has explained, the line between market and nonmarket
transactions in this context is blurry at best. See id. at 99-102 (explaining how unpaid
market labor highlights the problems associated with the market/family dichotomy). In
keeping with the general approach of this proposal to ensure that the tax laws interfere as
little as possible with the formation of economically interdependent relationships, I have
erred on the side of affording individuals wide latitude in determining for themselves
whether they fall on the market or nonmarket side of this dividing line. This respects the
autonomy of the service provider and service recipient while encouraging the redistribution
of wealth from the service recipient to the service provider. For a discussion of other steps
that might be taken that would help to better recognize the value of unpaid caregiving, see
Philipps, supra note 134, at 21-23.
234 Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1960) (quoting Bogardus v.
Comm'r, 302 U.S. 34, 43 (1937), and then quoting id. at 45 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
235 The fact that a transaction entered into for profit might turn out to be a losing
venture would not by itself remove the transaction from this disqualification. The same
phrase in I.R.C. § 165(c)(2) has been interpreted to similar effect. See 1 BITrKER &
LOKKEN, supra note 15, T 25.3 ("Since a disposition of depreciated property cannot
produce a profit, the 'transaction' to which § 165(c)(2) refers is not the sale. Rather, the
requirement is that the investment or activity must have been undertaken with the
expectation of profit.").
This disqualification would not apply to transfers at other than fair market value to a
transferee who has not rendered services to the taxpayer. By limiting the disqualification in
this way, gratuitous transfers of investment property would not be inadvertently deemed
ineligible for the nonrecognition election. Otherwise, only investment property purchased
with a gratuitous transfer in mind might be deemed eligible for the nonrecognition election.
Conversely, investment property (e.g., stock) purchased in a transaction entered into for
profit and held by the taxpayer for some time with this profit motive might be held
ineligible for the nonrecognition election upon a later change of holding purpose and
subsequent gratuitous transfer of the property to another. Restricting the disqualification to
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disqualifications would clearly exclude routine business-related transfers (e.g., the
payment of a bonus to an employee in property instead of cash) as well as other
remunerative transfers (e.g., a transfer of property to an individual who performs
paid household services for others on only a sporadic basis) from eligibility for the
nonrecognition election.
These disqualifications would not, however, go so far as to exclude transfers
of property between economically interdependent persons who also happen to
provide household services or unpaid market labor to each other from eligibility
for the nonrecognition election. These transfers would be eligible for the
nonrecognition election because the services would not have been provided in the
ordinary course of business or in a transaction entered into for profit. In contrast,
under current law, a transfer of property to someone who provides household
services or unpaid market labor to the transferor might very well be viewed as
taxable compensation, because the transfer is not being made out of detached and
disinterested generosity. Indeed, this ambiguity is the source of much of the
difficulty in applying the income tax exclusion for gifts and bequests to
nontraditional family arrangements.2 36
The buttressed disqualification rule also better squares with the current
practical approach to difficult cases that fall in the borderline area between tax-free
bequests and taxable payments for services rendered during the decedent's life:
The distinction between a tax-free bequest and a testamentary payment
of belated or supplemental compensation is difficult to administer,
especially in the case of domestic servants and trusted advisers whose
personal relationships with the decedent often ripen into intimate
friendships and who sometimes become virtual members of the family.
If the decedent did not agree to leave anything by will to the beneficiary,
a legacy ordinarily qualifies as a tax-free bequest . . .. The more vague
and informal the understanding, the more it resembles a garden variety
bequest by a lonely testator, who rewards a relative providing solace in
the form of personal attention in preference to other relatives who
contented themselves with verbal professions of affection.237
the context where services are rendered avoids this problem. As described above, see supra
text following note 219, true profit-oriented transfers should be excluded from eligibility
for the nonrecognition election by the restriction of the election to transfers at other than
fair market value.
236 See supra notes 207 and 208 and accompanying text. In the case of the traditional
family, one spouse's transfer of property to the other as compensation for the provision of
household services or unpaid market labor is not a taxable event by reason of I.R.C.
§ 1041, which affords the transferor nonrecognition treatment on the transfer of property to
a spouse or former spouse and deems the transferee to have acquired that property as a
(nontaxable) gift. Section 1041 therefore elides this significant interpretational difficulty in
the context of traditional families.
237 1 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 15, T 10.3.1.
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By focusing on the intention of the service provider rather than on the intention of
the service recipient, it may prove easier to distinguish property transfers between
individuals in economically interdependent relationships from payments for
services rendered. After all, a service provider who enters into a transaction to
make a profit is unlikely to rely on a "vague and informal . .. understanding" about
the possibility of payment, and is more likely to require that any arrangement be
memorialized in writing or,. at the very least, be the subject of an oral
understanding before starting work. Less formal arrangements are indicative of a
lack of profit motive for providing the services and suggest the existence of an
economically interdependent relationship that justifies eligibility for the
nonrecognition election.
4. De Minimis Exception
As this proposal contemplates that taxpayers will elect nonrecognition
treatment, some reporting and sharing of information will be required of
taxpayers.2 38 To ease this burden, it would be advisable to adopt a de minimis rule
along the lines of the one that exists in the Canadian tax system. Recall that, in
Canada, for all dispositions of personal-use property, the taxpayer's adjusted cost
base is deemed to be equal to the greater of $1,000 or the taxpayer's actual
adjusted cost base, and the taxpayer's proceeds of disposition are deemed to be
equal to the greater of $1,000 or the actual proceeds of disposition.2 39 A reasonable
figure for de minimis transfers of personal-use property (subject, of course, to
adjustment for inflation) should be adopted here -as well. It may also be advisable
to adopt an antiabuse rule (again, along the lines of the one that exists in the
Canadian tax system) that prevents taxpayers from splitting up what is really one
transfer into smaller component parts to take undue advantage of this de minimis
exception by multiplying it severalfold.2 40
238 Cf Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.215-1T (1984) (requiring the payee of alimony to
furnish her Social Security number to the payor of alimony, so that he can enter it on his
income tax return when taking a deduction for the alimony payment); Temp. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1041-lT, Q&A-14 (as amended in 2003) (requiring a transferor of property subject to
§ 1041 to, "at the time of the transfer, supply the transferee with records sufficient to
determine the adjusted basis and holding period of the property as of the date of the
transfer," because the transferee of the property takes the transferor's basis for purposes of
later computing a gain or loss on the sale or other disposition of the property, I.R.C. §
1041 (b)(2)).
239 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
240 See supra note 101.
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5. Transfer Tax Coordination
As a coordinating measure, the estate and gift tax marital deductions should
be repealed. 2 4 1 Because the nonrecognition election would benefit only those with
property and not those whose income consists solely of wages, it would be
advisable to retain the estate and gift taxes to enhance the overall progressivity of
the tax system. The estate and gift taxes could also be used (as they have been in
the past) as a means of deterring transfers of property solely to gain an income tax
advantage. And, nicely dovetailing with the approach to individual income tax
filing outlined here, Bridget Crawford has already proposed a reform of the estate
and gift taxes that would render these transfer taxes similarly relationship neutral
and reserve their application for only the wealthiest among us.242
C. Attribution of Ownership and Other Antiabuse Rules
Another means of deterring purely tax-motivated transfers of property is to
attach tax disadvantages to economically interdependent relationships as well as
the advantage of the nonrecognition election. Put differently, many of the
attribution of ownership rules and related party antiabuse rules that currently exist
in the U.S. federal income tax could be amended to apply to "economically
interdependent persons" rather than to persons (e.g., spouses and family members)
who are now merely assumed (correctly or incorrectly) to be in economically
interdependent relationships. 243 For example, I.R.C. § 267 could be amended to
disallow any loss realized and recognized on a transfer between economically
interdependent persons (or between persons who soon thereafter enter into an
economically interdependent relationship), just as losses are currently disallowed
between spouses and common-law partners in Canada. 2" In addition, the imputed
interest rules of I.R.C. § 7872 could be amended to apply to any below-market
loans between economically interdependent persons. By placing all such loans on
an equal footing with loans made at arm's length, there should be no need to
attribute any income produced by the loan proceeds to the lender, as occurs for
241 I.R.C. §§ 2056, 2523.
242 See generally Bridget J. Crawford, One Flesh, Two Taxpayers: A New Approach
to Marriage and Wealth Transfer Taxation, 6 FLA. TAx REv. 757 (2004).
243 See supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of how notions of
economic interdependence undergird many attribution and antiabuse rules. To hark back to
the Law Commission's methodology, see supra note 155 and accompanying text, these
attribution and antiabuse rules serve legitimate objectives, and it is appropriate to take
relationships into account for purposes of these rules because those relationships are the
source of possible abuse. This proposal improves upon the existing rules by better targeting
the types of relationships that are the source of abuse and allowing the taxpayer a role in
identifying the relationships that are most likely to be the source of abuse.
244 See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
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Canadian tax purposes. 24 5 Furthermore, the attribution of ownership rules of I.R.C.
§§ 267 and 318, which are incorporated by reference in many other U.S. federal
income tax provisions, could be amended to apply to economically interdependent
persons instead of "family members."
For this purpose, the term "economically interdependent persons" should be
specifically defined to include the transferor and transferee of property with
respect to which a nonrecognition election has been made.246 This is where the
elective aspect of nonrecognition treatment plays an important signaling role.
When an individual makes a transfer of property at other than fair market value
and elects not to recognize gain-with full knowledge that this election will entail
not only an immediate tax advantage, but also ongoing tax and nontax
disadvantages-the individual .taxpayer will have signaled the existence of an
economically interdependent relationship with the transferee. If the transferor
declines to make the nonrecognition election, then she will recognize any gain or
loss on the deemed disposition of the property for an amount equal to the
property's fair market value. Because, from a tax perspective, the transferor and
transferee are dealing at arm's length, the two need not be considered to be parties
to an economically interdependent relationship by reason of this transfer alone.247
Because gratuitous transfers of cash would be free from income tax even
without a nonrecognition election, the term "economically interdependent persons"
should be defined to include the transferor and transferee of a specified level of
cash beyond a threshold amount designed to cover routine gifts and other
gratuitous transfers that would be made even in the absence of an economically
interdependent relationship (i.e., a level akin to the current gift tax annual
exclusion).248 In determining whether a given cash transfer should be included in
computing this threshold, rules similar to those outlined above for determining
whether a transfer of property in exchange for services rendered should be eligible
for the nonrecognition election should be applied.249 Cash transfers should also be
245 See supra text accompanying notes 120-23.
246 In the case of transfers in trust, all ascertainable beneficiaries of the transfer should
be included among the group of economically interdependent persons.
247 For those worried about the possibility of abuse of the nonrecognition election by
those who wish to avoid the application of antiabuse rules, continue reading on in the text
above.
248 I.R.C. § 2503(b) (2006). The threshold could be applied separately each year, or it
could be applied to a multiyear average of cash transfers from the taxpayer to a given
transferee, or these two (or possibly other) approaches could be combined in an effort to
forestall manipulation.
249 See supra Part IV.B.3. Correlatively, the includibility of a cash transfer in the
gross income of the transferee should likewise be determined under these rules. In keeping
with the general steps taken in this proposal toward the harmonization of the income tax
and gift tax treatment of gifts, it will be necessary to further refine the income tax treatment
of transferees to clear up any remaining confusion created by the Duberstein standard in
situations other than a potential transfer of cash in exchange for services. See supra Part
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covered whether they are made outright or through a below-market loan, whether
they are made in a lump sum or in a series of payments over a specified period of
time, and should be aggregated together if they are part of a plan to avoid these
rules.
To prevent abuse of the de minimis exemption of personal-use property, a
specified aggregate amount of transfers of such property might trigger their
treatment as deemed transfers of cash (equal to the aggregate fair market value of
the property falling under this exemption) for purposes of applying this threshold.
Additionally, if there is concern that taxpayers might refuse to make the
nonrecognition election purely to avoid the disadvantages of being classified as
economically interdependent persons (e.g., in the case of a transfer of property
with a fair market value equal to its basis or of property that has appreciated very
little) or to reap the benefit of deducting a loss on the deemed disposition of
property, it might be advisable to break certain deemed dispositions of property
into their component parts. Under the proposal above for taxing transfers of
property between economically interdependent persons, a transfer of property at
other than fair market value automatically triggers a deemed disposition of the
property in exchange for an amount equal to the property's fair market value
(unless a nonrecognition election is made). Similar to the way in which I.R.C. §
7872 currently deals with the tax consequences of below-market loans, the
transferor of property with either (1) a built-in loss or (2) no (or possibly even a de
minimis amount of) built-in gain could be deemed first to transfer an amount of
cash equal to the fair market value of the property to the transferee as a gift. The
transferee would then be deemed to transfer that same amount back to the
transferor as consideration for the transfer of the property. The deemed transfer of
cash as a gift could then be required to be aggregated with the other cash transfers
made by the transferor to the transferee during the year for purposes of applying
the threshold for classification as "economically interdependent persons" described
in the previous paragraph.
The term "economically interdependent persons" should be further defined to
include persons bound by a support obligation. It should not matter whether that
support obligation is imposed by statute (e.g., the obligation of married spouses,
domestic partners, or parties to a civil union to support each other and of parents to
support their children), undertaken by contract (e.g., an obligation undertaken by
the parties to a private domestic partnership agreement), or represented to exist to
third parties (e.g., when two individuals represent that they will support each other
to a local governmental entity when registering as domestic partners or to an
employer when applying for domestic partner benefits). However, the existence of
a support obligation, by itself, should not conclusively determine the existence of
IV.B. 1. This further refinement is, however, beyond the scope of this Article and must be
left for another day. When fashioning any such refinements, it will also be necessary to
consider the Law Commission of Canada's four-part methodology to ensure that the
changes are relationship neutral. See infra Part IV.F.
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an economically interdependent relationship. There are, for example, spouses who
are bound by a support obligation but who keep their finances separately. Thus, an
economically interdependent relationship should be considered to exist only when
an individual bound by a support obligation actually provides at least a specified
fraction (e.g., one-quarter or one-third) of the support of the other.2 50 By requiring
one person to provide a specified percentage of the support of the other, this rule
will ensure that those who are currently assumed to be economically
interdependent (e.g., spouses) are only so treated if they actually share more than a
de minimis amount of financial resources. This classification also comports with
the studies that have shown that the earner of income tends to control how that
income is spent.2 51
This definition of "economically interdependent persons" should be written in
the disjunctive; that is, falling into any one of these categories should indicate the
existence of an economically interdependent relationship between the affected
individuals. Moreover, these economically interdependent relationships should be
deemed to continue for a specified period of time; for example, the relationship
could be deemed to continue for five or ten years 25 2 following the last
nonrecognition election, transfer of cash above the threshold amount, repayment of
a below-market loan, or provision of support above the requisite level. By adopting
a bright-line rule, there might be a possibility for individuals to engage in tax
planning; however, a sufficiently lengthy period of time (such as the five or ten
years mentioned above) would militate against such planning because of the
significant likelihood of intervening nontax events that might defeat any tax-
planning objective.253 Conversely, the occurrence of an event. with nontax
2o Naturally, this raises a factual question, but it is no different from the factual
question raised by existing requirements concerning the level of support that one individual
must provide to another in order to claim that person as a dependent for tax purposes.
I.R.C. § 152(c)(1)(D), (d)(1)(C).
251 See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
252 Or some other period of time that is long enough to deter those acting at arm's
length from attempting to act in concert to abuse these tax rules.
253 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 302(c)(2) (allowing a waiver of family attribution for purposes
of § 302 where the redeemed shareholder agrees not to acquire a prohibited interest in the
redeeming corporation for ten years).
A redemption of all of 'a shareholder's stock is properly treated as a sale
because it terminates the shareholder's interest in the corporation as effectively
as a sale to a third person. The sale analogy is not appropriate, however, if, after
the redemption, members of the ex-shareholder's immediate family own stock.
It is sufficiently possible that the seller will thereby continue his interest in the
corporation (without interference from the outside that might have resulted from
a sale to a third person) so that an attribution of his relative's shares to him is a
reasonable rule of thumb. If the seller is willing, however, to forgo for a ten-year
period any interest in the corporation (other than an interest retained as a
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consequences that clearly ruptures the relationship (e.g., divorce or death) could be
deemed to result in the earlier termination of the economically interdependent
relationship because the likelihood of manipulation of the tax rules would be low.
D. Attribution ofIncome
As described above, this proposal eschews the wholesale adoption of the
Canadian attribution of income rules. A more limited attribution rule would apply
under this proposal and require the attribution of income only when a transferor
retains some power over or interest in the transferred property, because, in that
situation, the transferor would still continue to be treated as the owner of the
property for tax purposes. The U.S. case law that has developed concerning the
assignment of income, which parallels the Canadian statutory assignment of
income rules described above,2 54 should continue to be applied after a move to
individual filing to guard against unwarranted income splitting.
Given the relationship between the creation of the income-splitting joint
return and the community property-common law divide in the United States,255 a
few words are also in order regarding this proposal's treatment of individuals who
are subject to state community-property regimes. In order to further relationship
neutrality and to end the privileging of marriage in our tax laws, state community-
property laws should be disregarded when applying federal income tax rules.256 In
making the case against recognizing community-property interests for federal
income tax purposes, one commentator has observed:
[S]ome critics contend that community property law is far from being
the great protector of married women's rights. While these laws create
rights for the wife (as well as for the husband) during marriage,
community property laws usually come into play only upon death or
divorce. During marriage, there is no guarantee that the dual ownership
afforded under community property law reflects any actual sharing of
control over marital assets. In California, for example, one spouse has
the right to sell or to encumber certain types of the couple's personal
property (such as stocks and bonds) without the consent of the other
creditor or acquired involuntarily by bequest), it is reasonable to waive the
family attribution rules and treat the redemption as a sale.
BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 189, 9.04[2][a].
254 See supra text accompanying notes 116-19.
255 See supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
256 State community-property laws are already disregarded in the application of a
number of federal tax provisions. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 32(c)(2)(B)(i), 219(f)(2),
220(b)(4)(C), 448(d)(4)(A), 457(e)(7), 530(f), 879.
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spouse. In this way, a husband can deprive his wife of considerable
control over these types of community assets.257
In view of these critiques, taxation should track ownership. If couples in
community-property states wish to split income produced by property, then they
should be required to transfer legal title to that property between them-with all of
the attendant consequences in terms of shifting the balance of power with regard to
the control of the property-just as everyone else must. Ignoring community-
property laws, then, the income earned by each person should be taxed to that
person, as required by Lucas v. Earl,2 58 and the income from property should be
taxed to the person who holds legal title to that property.
E. Allocation ofExpenses
In terms of the allocation of expenses, in keeping with the system's basic
focus on the individual, the person who incurs an expense should be the one
entitled to the deduction for that expense. If another pays an expense on the
taxpayer's behalf, then the transaction should be broken into its constituent parts
and taxed in accordance with the appropriate characterization of each leg of the
transaction.259 In other words, the payment of the expense should be considered
income to the taxpayer. Whether or not that income should be included in the
taxpayer's gross income would depend upon its character. Thus, if the payment of
the expense were in the nature of a gift, then the resulting income would be
excluded from gross income by I.R.C. § 102; however, if it were in the nature of a
payment for services rendered, then the resulting income would be included in
gross income under I.R.C. § 61(a)(1). The taxpayer would then be entitled to
deduct the expense-that is, if the expense were of a type that would otherwise be
deductible if paid by the taxpayer herself.
If a taxpayer is unable to use a deduction because she has insufficient income,
then the taxpayer should not be permitted to transfer the unused portion of the
257 Davis, supra note 36, at 239 (footnotes omitted).
Even when property is clearly community property under the law, each
spouse does not always have equal access to the property. Sometimes this is the
fault of the law itself since it does not always provide for equal participation by
each spouse in the management and control of the property. Although. older
community property laws, which gave sole management to the husband,
generally have been revised, complete joint management for all community
property assets does not exist, even in theory. Even when the law does provide
for joint management, reality often does otherwise.
Kornhauser, supra note 193, at 1416 (footnote omitted).
258 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
259 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716, 729-30 (1929).
2010]1 661
UTAH LAW REVIEW
deduction to another taxpayer, as is sometimes possible in the Canadian tax
system.2 60 Allowing one taxpayer to make a naked transfer of unused tax benefits
to another has no tax policy justification in a tax system based on the individual.
Moreover, accommodating the economically interdependent relationships that
taxpayers enter into is fundamentally different from affirmatively rewarding those
who enter into such relationships with tax benefits. 26 1
If Congress wishes a taxpayer who does not have sufficient income to benefit
from a deduction to nonetheless receive that benefit, then the appropriate
mechanism for providing the benefit is either to convert the deduction into a
refundable tax credit or to shift the delivery of the benefit out of the tax system
entirely.2 62 These alternatives also have the advantage of ensuring that the benefit
gets to the intended recipient rather than giving it to a third person whom the
government must merely hope and trust will deliver that benefit to the intended
recipient.
For administrative reasons, however, it may be advisable to allow taxpayers
who use a joint account to pay for certain expenses that are difficult to trace (e.g.,
charitable donations) to allocate the deduction (or credit) for that expense between
themselves as they see fit.263
F. Other Code Provisions that Take Relationships into Account
The preceding sections of this Part merely provide the broad outlines of an
individual filing regime that decentralizes family. Of course, there are many other
provisions in the Internal Revenue Code that turn on the existence of a familial or
marital relationship between the taxpayer and others. It is beyond the scope of this
260 See Brooks, supra note 78, at 73-74 (arguing against the ability of spouses to
transfer unused credits to each other on the ground that it has the "peculiar effect" of
allowing someone who owes no tax to get the benefit of the credit if married but not if that
same person is unmarried); Crago, supra note 74, at 34-36 (arguing that the ability to
transfer unused credits disproportionately benefits wealthy taxpayers).
261 Putting this in terms of the Law Commission's methodology, see supra note 155
and accompanying text, neither rules that permit one taxpayer to deduct the expenses of
another nor the naked transfer of tax benefits from one taxpayer to another serve a
legitimate objective in a tax system that is based on the individual.
262 See Brooks, supra note 78, at 73, 76-77 (in the Canadian context, advocating the
conversion of nonrefundable tax credits into refundable tax credits and further advocating
delivering support for child care expenses directly rather than indirectly through the tax
system); see generally Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case
for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23 (2006) (making the case on efficiency
grounds for using refundable tax credits as the default structure for tax incentives designed
to encourage socially beneficial behavior).
263 See Brooks, supra note 78, at 77 (approvingly describing this as the current




Article to analyze each and every one of these provisions to determine how they
might (or might not) fit within an individual filing system.
If an individual filing system along the lines described in this Article were to
be adopted, then it would be advisable to undertake an analysis of each of these
provisions using the methodology developed by the Law Commission of Canada to
determine whether relationship status is truly relevant to the objective to be
achieved by the provision. In some cases, the Law Commission's questions will
lead to a conclusion that a provision should be repealed (as was the case with the
Law Commission's analysis of the Canadian tax credit for support of a spouse or
common-law partner). In other cases, a provision will have a legitimate objective
and it will be necessary to determine whether the provision should be amended to
allow taxpayers to choose the relationships that are important to them (e.g., by
replacing the existing listed relationships with a reference to "economically
interdependent persons") or, if this proves impracticable, whether the provision
should be amended in some other way to better tailor it to the relevant
relationships.
By way of example, it seems that the alimony inclusion-deduction regime of
I.R.C. §§ 71 and 215, which allows different-sex couples to benefit from the
income-splitting privilege even after the breakup of.their relationship, would be
ripe for reconsideration and probably repeal after the adoption of this proposal-
after all, the foundation for this proposal is the abolition of the income-splitting
joint return.26 Similarly, it would seem that the medical expense deduction of
I.R.C. § 213-which allows a deduction for expenses paid for medical care
rendered to the taxpayer, the taxpayer's spouse, and the taxpayer's dependents-
would likewise be ripe for reconsideration and amendment or elimination. After
review, it might be concluded that § 213 should be repealed because the issue of
government support for extraordinary medical expenses is better addressed outside
of the tax system in the context of the broader, ongoing debate over health care
reform. Alternatively, it might be concluded that the deduction in § 213 should be
redesigned as a refundable tax credit for extraordinary medical expenses-to be
claimed by the taxpayer who received the medical care and actually incurred the
extraordinary medical expenses.265 Other examples abound; however, these
provisions are an obvious starting point for reconsidering the role of relationships
in the U.S. federal income tax laws.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article began with a summary of the critiques of the current U.S. joint
filing regime. All of these critiques call the legitimacy of the joint return into
serious question. Recently, several proposals have been made to redress some of
these shortcomings by extending joint filing to certain nontraditional family
264 See id. at 75 (arguing against Canada's alimony inclusion-deduction regime).
265 See supra Part IV.E.
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arrangements. Unfortunately, these proposals do no more than chip away at the
hegemony of the so-called traditional, nuclear family. They accept the privileging
of the traditional family in U.S. tax law and do no more than expand the circle of
privileged relationships to include those (and only those) who pattern their
relationships after the traditional family form. This Article has broken sharply with
these proposals by emphatically rejecting the privileging of the traditional family
in our federal tax laws.
Instead, this Article has outlined a proposal for an individual tax filing system
that not only recognizes that relationships can matter for tax purposes, but also
embraces and accommodates the diverse relationships that individuals actually
enter into-whether with spouses, partners, parents, children, cousins, aunts,
uncles, friends, or neighbors. This Article also goes beyond most previous
contributions to the literature that call for repeal of the joint return by actually
outlining a proposal for an individual filing system. It even goes beyond the few
contributions to the literature that have outlined such a proposal by sketching an
inclusive individual filing system rather than focusing all of its attention on how an
individual filing system should be tailored to. accommodate the peculiar needs of
married different-sex couples.
Nevertheless, the proposal outlined here is just that-an outline. An
exhaustive proposal for an individual filing system is beyond the scope of a single
article. Yet, even this partial picture gives us a sense of an individual filing system
that is not nearly as complex as its opponents might fear-and, in some ways, may
prove to be less complex than the joint filing regime that we currently have.266 In
any event, the aim of this Article is a modest one-namely, to highlight some of
the unspoken assumptions of the joint versus individual filing debate and to move
that debate in a direction that is more in line with the demographic and social
changes that have been unfolding in the United States for several decades. I look
forward to reactions to this proposal and to suggestions for its improvement.
266 See generally McMahon, supra note 2. In addition to avoiding what can be the
complex question of who is "married" for federal income tax purposes, see supra note 49
and accompanying text, and achieving some simplification through coordination of the
income and gift taxes, see supra note 231, a reexamination of the many income tax
provisions that implicate marital and familial status along the lines proposed by the Law
Commission of Canada has the potential to result in further simplification, as provisions
that do not legitimately introduce references to marital or familial status are amended or
eliminated from the Internal Revenue Code.
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